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This thesis reviews the decision-making dilemma caused
by information uncertainty and ambiguity produced during
crisis situations. Several cross-impact analysis techniques
are reviewed and evaluated as possible crisis decision-aids.
Cross-event analysis is selected and extended for demonstra-
tion in a hypothetical crisis situation involving South
Asia. The selected technique is operationalized and employed
in a controlled environment to assess policy response options
to the hypothetical crisis. The thesis then assesses the
technique's conceptual limitations, and evaluates its utility
as a potential crisis decision-aiding methodology.
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I. DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS SITUATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Accounts describing foreign policy-making indicate decision-
makers frequently deal with profuse quantities of intelligence
information; which may be inconclusive, ambiguous, or
conflicting. In an analysis of the Pearl Harbor surprise
attack, Wohlstetter reveals problems resulting from infor-
mation quantity and unclear meaning. She characterizes the
situation as one in which, "...the mass of signals grow
increasingly dense and freighted with ambiguities." [Ref. 1,
p. 3]. Sorensen points out that a recurring problem facing
Presidents is that the facts concerning a situation "may
be in doubt or dispute." [Ref. 2, p. 19], Schlesinger high-
lights the ambiguity surrounding the 19 6 3 Vietnam situation
by observing that the President asked; "Were you two gentle-
men in the same country?" [Ref. 3, p. 993], upon receiving
two widely divergent situation assessments from two officials
sent to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. This story also
demonstrates the important role individual perceptions play
in decision-making.
Analysts suggest perceptions influence the decision
process because decision-makers interpret information using
their insights, expectations, experience, and goals. Sprout
and Sprout refer to this as the "stateman's psychological
environment (that is his image, or estimate, of the situation.

setting, or milieu) [which] may or may not correspond to
the operational environment" [Ref. 4, p. 318]. Perceptions
are a key factor in recognizing crisis situations [Ref. 5]
.
Yet, it is in just such situations that information overloads
and inconsistencies, which may confound a decision-maker's
perceptions, seem to occur most dramatically [Ref. 6].
This chapter develops the concept that a "dilemma" exists
in decision-making resulting from information overload and
ambiguity. Establishing the dilemma's relationship to
crises, and establishing its effect on the decision process
requires introducing several relevant concepts. These include,
identifying a basic decision process model, defining the
concept of crisis, identifying its stress and information
overload effects on decision-making, and examining factors
which may reduce the dilemma. The purpose is to establish
the need for a decision-aiding methodology which can lessen
the dilemma's impact on the policy-making process.
B. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
According to general decision-making theory, as developed
by Turban and Meredith [Ref. 7], the first step in the
decision-making process is problem identification. The same
Subsequent steps include: searching for the alternative
courses of action, evaluating the alternatives, and solution
selection. These steps were not examined in detail but
should be kept in mind during the discussion of the approaches
to foreign policy analysis.
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source suggests identifying problems through comparing
desired and actual levels of goal attainment. This pre-
supposes that organizational goals are explicit, and in a
form which facilitates measuring their level of accomplishment.
Such a requirement may be met in product oriented organi-
zations (capturing a specific share of the market, or
obtaining a specific profit level) however, it becom.es much
more difficult in organizations which frame goals in terms
2
of advancing or protecting the nation's interests. Thus,
in starting the decision process, the policy-maker immediately
faces a problem using available information to determine what
national interests an emerging situation threatens. The
available information's accuracy greatly influences the pre-
cision of national interest identification and measurement.
Turbin and Meredith [Ref . 7] propose using an evalua-
tion shceme in completing the decision process. The evalua-
tion scheme requires some technique which predicts alternative
response outcomes, a means of relating outcomes to goals,
and a decision rule applicable to response selection. The
authors also describe factors which complicate the decision
process
.
2This problem directly relates to the requirement for
a method of system monitoring which would be basic to a
decision-aiding system. This aspect of the aid was not
developed extensively in the current study due to its com-
plexity and the time required to develop, and validate
indicators. Significant research is being conducted in this
area by C.A. iMcClelland and others in the Threat Recognition
and Analysis Project [Ref. 8].
11

Complications develop in decision-making when incorpora-
ting multiple goals, evaluating an indefinite number of
alternatives, and determining how sensitive outcomes are
to changes in problem configuration. (Changes in problem
configuration could result from incomplete or inaccurate
information. These slight changes may alter a policy alterna-
tive's impact on overall situational outcomes, and require
an analysis of the sensitivity of the policy option's effect
to changing circumstances.) The above problems obviously
exist in the policy decision process. This study's major
premise is that an information processing dilemma, beyond
the range of these problems, further complicates policy
decision-making in a crisis situation. The characteristics
defining a crisis situation produce this dilemma.
C. THE CONCEPT OF CRISIS
Traditional international relations studies often ex-
plore the relationship between "crisis" and "normal" inter-
actions. These works, usually describing events surrounding
a crisis, give the concept several intuitive interpretations.
The most common among these view crises as marking "turning
points" in international relations. Other interpretations
describe crises as events which occur naturally within the system.
In the Marxist-Leninist perspective, the occurrance of
international crisis is an expression of the process of world
revolution. Traditional power theory explains crisis as the
operation of the balance of power. Here, crisis results from
changes in the distribution of power, or from policy makers




In his essay on "The Acute International Crisis," McClelland
reviews these interpretations and concludes:
The crises are thought to be connected
with the international struggles for
ideas and also for power. They are seen
as indicators of the state of the
international system, but are regarded
as prime operations in the system as
well. They seem to be related to going
to war and to staying at peace. [Ref. 9, p. 188].
Obviously, crisis is a pivotal concept in international rela-
tions. The problem is to establish it as a distinct phenomenon
with recognizable characteristics.
Recent theoretical approaches to international rela-
tions studies attempt to operationalize the concept of
crisis. These approaches are examined in a later section
developing the dilemma's impact on the policy decision pro-
cess. The approach advanced by Hermann [Refs. 10 and 11]
was selected as most relevant to the current study. He des-
cribes three dimensions which bound a crisis situation.
1. High Threat
The first dimension defining crisis arises because
the situation poses "a potential hindrance or obstruction to
some object or state of affairs that a decision-making unit
is motivated to achieve." [Ref. 10, p. 29]. A situation
that threatens important goals produces fear that failure
to make a "good" decision could leave these goals in jeopardy.
Having accurate and timely information, therefore, becomes
extremely important. The other dimensions bounding the
situation make it less likely such information is available.
13

2. Short Response Time
Combining with the high threat factor is the real-
ization that in a short period of time, if no action is
taken, the situation may change in some major (unfavorable)
way. This aspect requires reaching a decision quickly, al-
lowing little time for collecting information. Furthermore,
short response time does not permit establishing elaborate
search routines to disclose alternative response options.
Thus, information currently available forms the basis for
the decision. While decision-makers may receive more informa-
tion, its accuracy is questionable, and individual percep-
tions become more important in determining what policy actions





This final dimension results from the "absence of
awareness on the part of policy makers that the situation
is likely to occur." [Ref. 10, p. 30]. This surprise aspect
may stem from incomplete information, or result from a
policy-maker's satisfaction with the situation, producing
a reluctance to believe contrary reports. Surprise makes
it unlikely advance preparations exist for coping with the
situation, producing an "ad-hoc" decision process. Surprise
also prevents serious data-collection which usually precedes
significant anticipated events [Ref. 11, p. 416]. These





In responding to a developing crisis, policy-makers
face a dilemma dealing with breakdowns in what information
usually means. As a crisis situation emerge, policy-makers
receive unanticipated information inputs. These inputs are
unexpected because they differ from perceptions concerning
"normal" information outputs which the situation should be
generating. Thus, the dilemma's first aspect involves un-
derstanding seemingly "unique" events. Policy-makers must
correctly assess this information to realize that a problem
exists, and to determine its importance.
As the crisis continues, more unique inputs flow in,
increasing the information load the policy-maker must pro-
cess [Ref. 12]. This aspect taxes the decision units'
. . . 4
ability to sort and rapidly interpret available information.
Janis and Mann [Ref. 14] identify several compensating proce-
dures individuals use in coping with information overload.
4A large body of literature exists indicating that in-
dividuals are sub-optimal information processors. Fisher,
et al. [Ref. 13] review the literature on individual's in-
formation processing abilities. Their report indicates that
unaided human judgements in complex decision tasks are often
less accurate than formal algorithms. For instance, evidence
presented indicates that individuals are conservative in
interpreting data due to misperception and misaggregation.
This implies that decisions are normally based on a small
number of information items, thus excess data and effort spent
in its collection is "wasted". Other evidence, collected
from "real-world" studies, indicates that decision-makers
have difficulty using multiple cue information.
The current study examines the way in which crisis
situations further reduce decision-makers' capabilities to
utilize information. The Fisher report indicates that the




Many of these inhibit the accurate evaluation of response
alternatives
.
Evaluation also requires dependable information. Un-
fortunately, information during a crisis may be inaccurate
or conflicting due to source unavailability or distortion.
iMany factors might cause this distortion; however, the
effect is to reduce useful information. The policy maker
must discriminate between relevant and irrelevant; reliable
and unreliable information. A crisis situation's high
threat and time pressure components imapir the discrimina-
tion ability which information ambuiguity requires.
One of this study's central propositions is that: Policy-
makers in a crisis situation must struggle to interpret
large quantities of unusual data, having ambiguous or con-
flicting meaning. Because the situation involves high
threat, the perception develops that the decision is crucial.
The rapid event flows require accurate information evaluation,
and allow a limited decision time. The situation's surprise
characteristic precludes utilizing routine response measures.
To interpret large quantities of ambiguous data the policy-
maker must rapidly and efficiently focus all available informa-
tion and expertise on the situation.
Reviewing current approaches to foreign policy analysis
indicates that this dilemma affects the entire policy-making
process. This review reveals the requirement for a real
time decision-aiding methodology which can reduce the infor-
mation dilemma's impact on policy formulation.
16

E. FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
Traditional foreign policy studies developed the found-
ations for more systematic approaches in identifying threats
to national interests (crises) . Hermann [Ref . 10] and
McClelland [Ref. 9] review the intuitive interpretations of
crisis found in descriptive international relations studies.
The early works these authors review describe crises as
"turning points" in international relations.
Crises were believed to result from competing national
interests , or as situations which developed from a series
of events a nation viewed as somehow posing a threat to its
interests. The effort to develop a more exact understanding
of foreign policy and crises produced two broad analytic
approaches. These approaches can be classified "systemic"
and "decisions;" both advance theoretical arguments and
research findings revealing the policy maker's dilemma.
Parker [Ref. 15] describes the tenets of these two approaches
and their major contributions.
A third approach stems from applying information theory
to foreign policy analysis, contributing new insights about
communications flows in policy-making. This technique
attempts to quantify concepts such as uncertainty and "noise."
1. Systems Approach
The systems approach views crisis as an indication
of the overall state of the system, directly related to
17

system stability. The connection to the traditional
intuitive interpretations is obvious. From this viewpoint it
can be argued the occurrence of crises can be used to iden-
tify the emergence of a problem situation.
An alternative view of crisis in systems studies
proposes that it is a prime operation in the system itself.
This view utilizes March and Simon's bureaucratic process
model [Ref. 17]. In this model, organizations (modernizing
societies) strive for stability in their environment. Recog-
nizing a problem as having been dealt with previously, the
organization tends to employ repetitive responses. As a
result the organization establishes routine procedures when-
ever possible. Crises, in this model, are complexes of
events overflowing normal processing channels, forcing new
outputs, which return to the environment producing new
inputs until new solutions are found [Ref. 9]. This sequence
demonstrates how information ambiguity and uncertainty impact
the decision process.
2. Decisions Approach
The second major approach to foreign policy analysis
suggests that a stimulus-response relationship exists be-
tween crisis and decision [Ref. 11] . This approach highlights
McClelland [Ref. 9] derives this interpretation from
Hans J. Morgenthau's Politics Amoung Nations . Price [Ref.
16] proposes that system stability and decision unit flexi-
bility combine to define the range of options decision-
makers consider in a crisis situation.

the importance that decision-makers' perceptions play in
responding to incoming data.
The decisions approach identifies crisis as a sit-
uational variable affecting the decision process in two
ways. These result from crisis' stress inducing character-
istics, and their impact on information processing. These
factors are closely interrelated but, for reasons of clarity,
are explored separately in this study.
Hermann [Ref. 10] proposes that crises are situations
involving high threat, allowing short response time, and
surprising the decision unit. Holsti [Ref. 6], and other
authors [Ref. 14], present psychological evidence demonstrating
that these characteristics are stress inducing. The findings
indicate that crisis induced stress reduces decision-making
capabilities, especially those involved in identifying,
sorting, processing, and interpreting information.
Foreign policy studies [Ref. 6], and field experi-
ments [Ref. lOJ
,
give credence to these conclusions. These
Sprout and Sprout fully develop this concept in their
works [Ref. 4 and 18 J . Holsti, et al, [Ref. 5] modeled the
process utilizing this factor. The model included: (1) the
stimulus (meaning policy) applied by the initiating state,
(2) the perception of the stimulus by the receiving state's
decision unit, C3) the receiving state's policy response, and
(4) response perception by the initiating state's decision unit
7A high degree of threat to important values produces
anxiety and overreaction. Long working hours required by
short response times, and the perception of that pressure,
magnify stress. Unanticipated, novel situations (surprise)
are generally more threatening to decision-makers [Ref. 6].
19

findings indicate that policy makers face a dileinina inter-
preting and using information throughout the entire decision
process. Finally, indications are that stress is self-
reinforcing, suggesting that the dilemma increases as the
situation continues [Ref. 6].
These studies reveal how stress affects the decision
process by reducing the decision unit's ability to process
information. One study went further and examined informa-
tion volume produced during the crisis leading to World
War I [Ref. 6]. Holsti's findings indicate that both infor-
gmation flow and uncertainty rose during the pre-war period.
This increases both stress and information overlaod [Ref. 14]
,
3 . Information Theory
Using information theory in foreign policy analysis
is a relatively new approach which clarifies the relation-
ship between uncertainty and stress. It measures information
levels and uncertainty contained in transmitted messages.
Studies using this technique report findings which relate to
interpreting incoming intelligence information.
Lee [Ref. 21] explains information measurement, and
demonstrates that "noise" in the system produced by erroneous
gOther studies have explored the role of uncertainty
in the occurrence of war. Singer, et al. [Ref. 19] conclude
that the changing role of uncertainty accounts for the differ-
ent time spans for which their models predicted the occurrence
of conflicts. An attempt to formalize the procedure used
in the Singer study demonstrated the potential importance
of uncertainty in the decision process [Ref. 20].
20

or conflicting information reports significantly reduces
a message's information value. McClelland [Ref. 22] uses
information theory in developing a measure of uncertainty,
which he employed in studying the Berlin question. This
value represents uncertainty levels present in a given sit-
uation. This uncertainty reflects analysts' efforts to
respond to the other side's actions. Uncertainty, measured
in terms of H-Rel values, increased fairly sharply during
9
"obvious" crisis phases in the Berlin problem.
These findings demonstrate that policy decisions are
made under uncertainty and increased information volume.
This situation strains the decision-maker's ability to cope
with an unfolding situation. Threat, time pressure, and
surprise combine to increase stress, and further degrade
decision-making capabilities.
The preceding discussion explored the information
dilemma facing policy makers. This dilemma involved three
aspects: (1) responding to unexpected information, (2) coping
with increased information volume, and (3) interpreting
ambiguous, conflicting reports. Because the dilemma reduces
decision-making capabilities, the requirement exists for
a decision-aid to reduce its impact on the decision process.
9H-Rel is defined as the ratio of absolute uncertainty
(some knowledge of performance) to maximum uncertainty (no
performance data known). As this ratio approaches 1.00,
it suggests that the behaviors have shown increasing signs
of disorderliness , or indicates a large amount of "variety"
in event emissions [Ref. 22, p. 172] .
21

To be useful such an aid must perform several
functions
.
F. REDUCING THE DILEMMA
The problems of multiple goals, evaluating an
indefinite number of options, possible slight changes
in problem configuration, and the need to incorporate new
information complicates the policy decision process [Ref.
7]. A useful decision-aid must, therefore, react to changing
circumstances and incorporate diverse inputs.
Information relevant to a particular situation is
often incomplete, outdated, or inaccurate. The decision-
maker must, therefore, be able to draw on data other than
information about the immediate situation [Ref. 11]. The
perceptions and judgments of specialists in the field might
be one source of such data. The decision-aid should focus
specialists' expertise and knowledge to extract meaning from
incomplete information.
A true decision-aiding system - as opposed to an infor-
mation processing system - should help reduce the problem.
It should facilitate problem identification, aid in enumera-
ting options, and help determine their potential outcomes.
It should also provide the means to evaluate outcomes, and
indicate optimum responses.
The short response time inherent in a crisis situation
requires rapid yet considered action. To reduce decision
time and allow thorough evaluation, the decision-aid should
22

be computer adaptable. This capability would permit
obtaining interactions from numerous, geographically separate
analysts and specialists. It would also provide the capa-
bility for conducting sensitivity analysis, and hard copy
results for later analysis.
G. OBJECTIVES
This research project will develop and evaluate a poten-
tial real time decision-aiding technique to examine policy
options for response in a crisis situation. A decision
analysis methodology which deals with alternative evaluation
under uncertainty will be selected as the basis for the
potential decision-aid.
After determining the methodology's information input
requirements, working assumptions, limitations, and alterna-
tive operation procedures, the methodology will be adapted
into a policy analysis format. Designing a policy analysis
format requires structuring the methodology to identify and
rank national objectives affected by a specific problem, to
identify possible response options supporting those objectives,
to determine each option's contribution to achieving those
objectives, and to evaluate their relative merit.
The modified technique will then be demonstrated in a
controlled environment. A study group, representing experts,
will be presented with a hypothetical crisis situation
in which the objective is to determine an effective response.
The technique will be used to guide the group in their
consideration of the problem, and to correlate their inputs.
23

Based on this demonstration, the analytic technique
will be evaluated on its effectiveness in structuring and
obtaining a solution to the problem. The technique's util-
ity will be assessed regarding its flexibility, ease of
application, performance, and potential for computerization.
H. CONCLUSIONS
A crisis is defined by three "situational" boundaries
[Refs. 10 and 11] .
1. High threat to decision unit goals.
2. Short response time available.
3. Surprising the decision unit by its occurrance.
These dimensions impact the decision process producing three
complicating factors which reduce a decision-maker's already
questionable abilities [Ref. 13] to perform effectively when
it is vitally important to do so.





Increases in the levels of these factors, combined with poor
information processing capabilities, produces a dilemma in
interpreting information concerning a rapidly evolving situa-
tion.
This dilemma reduces the decision-maker's ability to:
1. Identify relevant useful data.
2. Correlate and interpret infromation.
3. Use this information to draw accurate inferences,
and make responsible judgments.
4. Determine appropriate response alternatives, and
evaluate their utility.
5. Make a logical solution selection.
94

Reducing this dilemma to improve decision-making
abilities requires a decision-aid which is:
1. Flexible enough to incorporate multiple goals,
diverse options, and incomplete information.
2. Draws on the "stored information" of an expert's
perceptions to interpret the situation.
3. Quickly focuses the expertise and knowledge of




Systematically evaluates alternatives and indicates
an optimal response.
5. Is computer adaptable.
Subsequent chapters of this study will identify and
examine an existing decision analysis technique, develop
it into a possible policy analysis tool, demonstrate its





The previous chapter identified problems facing decision-
makers operating in an environment characterized by uncertainty
and ambiguous information. In a social or political environ-
ment, moving from problem awareness to effective control or
corrective actions requires that decision-makers understand
the complex relationships operating in the environment. Such
understanding is inhibited when a problem's components are
defined and related through imprecise concepts and incomplete
theories
.
As indicated earlier, social and political problems are
not easily adaptable to systematic "scientific" analysis.
In many cases, the problem elements are not adequately defined
nor operationalized. Furthermore, no adequate theory exists
which describes the complex relationships among problem ele-
ments and indicators. These difficulties are apparent in
the attempts to construct theories, define variables, and
identify reliable indicators for crises reviewed in Chapter
One.
Socio-economic and political problems are defined using
imprecise concepts based on a limited understanding of the
relationships among the variables involved. For this reason,
conducting systematic decision analysis requires an alterna-
tive approach to problem specification. The basis for one
alternative approach is suggested by Helmer:
26

. . .we can either throw up our hands
in despair and wait until we have an
adequate theory enabling us to deal
with socio-economic problems as con-
fidently as we do with problems in
physics and chemistry, or we can
make the most of an admittedly unsat-
isfactory situation and try to obtain
the relative intuitive insights of
experts and then use their judgments
as systematically as possible,
[cited in Ref. 23, p. 2]
The Delphi Technique was an early approach to employing
subjective judgments in problem evaluation. It was sub-
jected to several criticisms, one being that it produced
"linearly independent" estimates which failed to account
for potential interactions among the events being considered
[Ref. 24]. Cross-Impact analysis is a Delphi extension
intended to overcome this problem.
This chapter will present a non-technical explanation of
the fundamental notions underlying cross-impact analysis.
It will identify and classify contentious issues which must
be resolved before the technique can be used. This discussion
is intended to provide a basis for systematically comparing
the various approaches to conducting cross-impact analysis.
Specific areas which will be explored include: (1) the tech-
nique's basic concepts, (.2) its information requirements
and their interpretations, (3) the computational procedure
used, and (4) the technique's outputs and possible applica-
tions .
In their review of the literature on decision-making,
Fischer, et. al. examine several decision-aiding technologies
27

which use subjective estimates. These technologies follow
a "decomposition" approach involving six tasks:
1. Recognizing that a decision
problem exists.
2. Identifying the possible
courses of action.
3. Constructing a probabilistic
model of the decision-making
environment.
4. Constructing a model to eval-
uate the possible consequences
of each available action.
5. Selecting a course of action.
6. Implementing the alternative
selected.
[Ref . 13, p. 43-44]
.
Because steps 1, 2, and 6 involve understanding the
creative and organizational processes inherent in decision-
making, most decision-aiding technologies concentrate on
steps 3, 4, and 5. As this study will show, cross-impact
analysis fits in well with these techniques. Cross-impact
analysis is similar to other subjective techniques in that:
it develops an event set for defining the problem environment,
it constructs a probabilistic model of that environment, and
it uses the model to evaluate possible courses of action.
It should be noted that, on occasion, an entire commun-
ity's evaluation can "miss the mark". The recent events in
Iran provide an example. Reportedly the entire intelligence
community was surprised at the situation's rapid deteriora-
tion (two crisis dimensions) [Ref. 25]. A large body of
psychology and organizational information processing litera-
ture addresses the causes of this phenomenon. These causes
are outside this study's scope, which attempts to develop




Cross-impact analysis is a technique which attempts to
identify a given situation's possible outcomes by quantifying
the linkages between potential developments. This is accom-
plished by systematically assessing how any particular event
impacts all other relevant events. The technique and its
various applications are based on the realization that most
events are connected in some way [Ref. 26]. As explained
by Gordon and Hayward: "it is hard to imagine an event
without a predecessor which made it more or less likely or
influenced its form - or one which, after occurring, left
no mark." They term these possible interrelationships "cross-
impacts" [Ref. 26, p. 101].
A second principle behind this technique is, that due
to the nature of the "inexact sciences", the only possible
approach to quantifying these interrelationships is to
employ an expert's subjective judgments as a "substitute
for the exact laws of causality found in the physical sciences."
[Ref. 24, p. 134] . When the technique is employed, estimates
are obtained for three event aspects hypothesized to govern
possible interactions among future developments: (1) Mode -
whether an event "enhances" or "inhibits" another; (2) Strength -
how strong an impact one event has on another; and (3) Time
Lag - how long before an event's influence is felt by other
*
events. These aspects are developed in Gordon, Enzer, and
Martino [Refs. 26, 27, and 28]. While latter cross-impact
approaches do not assess these aspects explicitly, understanding
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the interaction concept is important to understanding the
intention and approach behind the analysis.
As a corollary to using subjective estimates, group
opinions are usually obtained on the basis that: "The
accuracy of a group judgment is always greater than (or at
least equal to) the average accuracy of the individual
judgments." [Dalkey, cited in Ref. 29, p. 140]. Fischer,
et. al. report several other studies which support this
conclusion [Ref. 13, p. 50].
C. REQUIRExMENTS FOR CONDUCTING CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS
To develop a probabalistic model of the problem environ-
ment using cross-impact analysis requires that four proce-
dures be accomplished. The first three encompass the sub-
jective estimation process and include: (1) specifying an
event set which defines the environment, (.2) estimating the
initial occurrence probabilities of those events, and (3)
estimating their interactions with each other (or their
cross-impacts) . The final procedure manipulates the model
formed by these estimates to produce the data with which
possible courses of action are evaluated. This step requires
(4) developing an algorithm to use in the manipulation process
These procedures will be explained in detail below.
There are a number of subjective measurement techniques
which depend upon aggregating group estimates. Subjective
measurement, aggreation procedures and applications are dis-
dussed in Torgerson, iMiller, and Coombs [Refs. 30, 31, and 32] .
The commonly used, group-based subjective measurement techniques
rely heavily on central tendencies (i.e., means and standard
deviations) in order to determine judgmental scores.
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1. Event Set Specification
The first process undertaken in cross-impact analy-
sis is developing an event set. This is "a set of possible
events which are thought to be important to the issue being
explored" [Ref. 33, p. 33]. The event set may be obtained
in any manner: delphi, conferences, literature searches,
consultations with experts, analyst specification, and
so forth. A single event may address any subject, and the
entire set may address any combination of subjects such as,
"potential technological developments, a list of social or
political developments, a combination of these, or something
entirely different." [Ref. 34, p. 344].
As broad and loose as these requirements may seem,
the means by which the event set was formulated in several
of the demonstrations discussed in this study has been criti-
cized as faulty [Ref. 29, p. 137]. Therefore, it seems
relevant to review recommendations for accomplishing this
process
.
Enzer suggests candidate events be developed from the
likely consequences of inaction, or allowing the "status-quo"
to continue [Ref. 27, p. 50]. He also proposes several
criteria for including candidate events in the analysis:
(1) the development must be important
to the subject being evaluated, in
the sense that the event should
have some impact on an action or
a decision that is being contem-
plated.
(2) only those important developments
whose outcome is uncertain (that

is, those that may occur as
opposed to those that almost
certainly will or will not occur)
should be included in the set
being analyzed.
(3) if the event set is to be highly
limited it is also desirable for
the items to be causally re-
lated to each other in some
way. [Ref. 35, p. 345]12
(4) Developments or events as referred
to here denote specific items
which may occur in the future.
They are 'specific' in the
sense that their occurrence
or non-occurrence can be
rigorously determined.
[Ref. 27, p. 50]
.
Mitchell and Tydeman propose several rules for event
fonnulation. Their purpose is to reduce possible respondent
misinterpretation and thereby reduce response variation.
These rules will be followed in the application section of
this study.
(a) Except where the cause is part
of the event to be studied,
events should not be stated in
the form 'A occurs because of B'.
Cb) Events should be single rather
than multiple, i.e., 'A occurs'
rather than 'A,B, and C occur'.
(c) Events should, where possible,
be definite and specific rather
than vague and general, e.g.,'
Enzer develops the requirement of being "causally related"
through the concept of "coupling". He describes three types
of event coupling, "totally uncoupled", "coupled", and totally
included". Of these, totally uncoupled events are felt to
be of little importance in the analysis, coupled events
should be analyzed, and included events may be analyzed if
their impacts are not estimated more than once [Ref. 27, p. 52].
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'Costs will increase more than
20% in real terms' rather than
'Costs will increase signific-
antly' . [Ref . 29, p. 136] .
Formulation rules are necessary to insure that "the group
involved reach agreement and understanding on the specifica-
tion and wording of the event set." [Ref. 36, p. 333].
Although it is desirable that the event set completely
define the problem under consideration, this is rarely possi-
ble. The uncertainties in the problem environment, and the
complex issues involved could necessitate specifying many
events. Since the possible first order interactions between
events increases as the square of the number of events speci-
fied, estimating their interactions would quicJcly become
extremely time consuming [Ref. 34]. Therefore, completeness
13is often obtained by fiat. Since it is almost impossible
to specify an event set which includes every conceivable
development most analysts limit the event set to a manage-
able size and attempt to include the most important or signi-
ficant events. In such cases, events to be included in the
analysis are selected from a large list of "candidate" events
on the basis of subjective importance, desirability, or
impact ratings. These procedures will be described in the
next chapter.
1 3
This limitation's implications have been examined m
several cross-impact approaches. The developers CEnzer, Turoff,
and Mitchell and Tydeman) suggest different methods to iden-
tify the most important events and to retain the most sensi-
tive or influential ones for analysis. In this manner, it is
felt that the most serious aspects of a problem are considered.'
Furthermore, it is always possible to expand the event set
as circumstances dictate. Thus, obtaining a complete event
set by "fiat" is felt to be the only practicable method,
and does not impose severe limitations.

2. Initial Probabilities
Once the event set is established and understood by
the respondents, the next procedure obtains estimates for
each event's "initial" likelihood of occurrence. These esti-
mates are variously termed individual, initial or marginal
. . . 14probabilities. All refer to a particular event's likeli-
hood of occurring by some specified date.
As with event specification, Enzer suggests that
these estimates should be developed from an environment which
might evolve naturally from the current situation [Ref. 35].
This interpretation recognizes that developments are typically
seen in their total environment, and not in isolation.
This viewpoint poses a conceptual problem with cross-
impact analysis which must be resolved before the technique
can be operationalized. If events are viewed in their total
environment when their initial probabilities are estimated,
do these estimates include a consideration of the occurrence
of other likely events in the set? In other words, in esti-
mating the initial probability that event A will occur, do
respondents implicitly consider the impact on A of another
event (say B) if the other event also occurs? Each approach
to cross-impact analysis must deal with this problem, and
Different terms are applied by the various cross-impact
analysis approaches to describe the technique's basic
concepts. In this study these will be identified as they
occur, and thereafter the most descriptive, or logically
consistent term will be used.
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it will be considered more fully while examining specific
approaches
.
A reasonable response to this problem appears to
be that estimators do take the interrelationships among
events into consideration, but only incompletely and not
systematically. Therefore, some modification is necessary
to obtain "consistent" estimates [Ref. 34, p. 342].
3. Cross-Impacts
The next process obtains "A qualitative description
of the effect of the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of one
event on the likelihood of occurrence of the other events
in the set." [Ref. 27, p. 51]. These are subjective esti-
mates concerning how an event's occurrence would change the
probability of every other event's occurrence. These are
binary estimates, dealing with the interactions between two
events only.
In eliciting these estimates, respondents are told
to assume certain occurrence (or non-occurrence) for an
event and then assess its impact on each remaining events.
Rules for event impact assessment state that the events are
assumed to happen only once (i.e., non-repetitive), that
they do not have to happen at all, and that they do not
occur simultaneously [Ref. 36].
These estimates have been termed "conditional" or
"causal" probabilities. This conflict in terms stems from
another conceptual problem in cross-impact analysis, relating
directly to the problem of obtaining consistent estimates.
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The basic problem is determining how the cross-impacts
should be interpreted. One interpretation is that the esti-
mates are conditional probabilities in the "classical"
sense (i.e., the probability of event A given event B has
occurred, P(A|b)), or are used to derive conditional proba-
bilities [Ref . 37] . Accepting this interpretation permits
using Bayesian probability relationships to test estimate
consistency. Several developers have derived conditions which
are intended to insure consistency and can be used to com-
. 15pute probability bounds on subsequent estimates. Another
interpretation is that the estimates are causal, time-dependent
probabilities to which classical probability rules do not
apply (i.e., the probability A will occur assuming B occurs
first, P(A|b^)). In this case Bayesian probability rela-
tionships have only limited application [Ref. 3 9]
.
A third interpretation is that the technique attempts
to obtain subjective estimates for the correlation coeffi-
cients between events. In this case inconsistency is not
readily apparent, as when probability values exceed unity
or become negative. Turoff applies this interpretation in
his cross-impact approach [Ref. 36].
This problem will be examined in detail in the next
chapter. Initially, however, it appears that using classical
probability relationships not only permits testing estimates
^^See, for example, Dalkey and Sarin [Refs. 34 and 38]
for consistency conditions and boundaries.
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for consistency, but provides relationships for adjusting
inconsistent estimates, and furnishes a model for their
manipulation. Without such a model, and recognizing the
lack of causal knowledge in the social sciences, the tech-
nique faces problems in interpreting the subjective esti-
mates, and justifying the manipulation algorithms.
4 . Computational Procedure
The final cross-impact analysis process employs a
technique to analyze estimates and provide useful informa-
tion to decision makers. As noted by Dalkey, given the
large numbers of possible interactions,
even if a matrix describing the inter-
actions is available . . . the task of
thinking through the implications
rapidly gets out of hand. Some com-
putational aid is required to take
account of the large number of inter-
dependencies. [Ref. 34, p. 341].
Frequently, the approach conducts "a Monte Carlo
sampling of chains of events in which the probability of
an event in the chain is modified by the cross-impact of
the previously occurring event in the chain." [Ref. 34,
p. 341] . This procedure requires an algorithm for calculating
the cross-impact effects among events. Several methods of
manipulation and analysis have been proposed and are examined
in the next chapter.
It also seems that probability values imply that A and
B are discrete events; whereas correlation coefficients, "r",
imply that A and B are indicators of underlying variables to




In the Monte Carlo process, an event is randomly
selected, and its occurrence or non-occurrence randomly
decided based on its initial probability. The remaining
events' initial probabilities are adjusted using the selected
algorithm, according to the first event's cross-impacts.
At this point a second event is selected and decided, based
on its new probability. The remaining probabilities are
revised and the process continues until all events have been
decided.
Completing the Monte Carlo procedure is termed a
run. Conducting numerous runs permits calculating revised
initial probabilities for each event based on the event's
experimental frequency of occurrence. As an event is decided
its occurrence of non-occurrence is recorded (either 1 or
respectively)
. Revised initial probabilities are then
determined by dividing the number of times each event
occurred by the total number of runs conducted.
Early research using the technique suggested con-
ducting more than one thousand runs in order to reach sta-
bility and reduce random variation [Ref. 26]. However, during
demonstrations as few as twenty runs produced adequate re-
sults [Ref. 27] . Johnson examined the requirements con-
cerning how many runs were needed to produce significant
probability shifts and stabilize inherent random variation
[Ref. 40] . Using standard statistical techniques he concluded
that: (1) The mean probability values for events reached
stability within a small number of runs (< 50) . This implies
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that the model reached stability, or a consistent point,
relatively quickly. (2) The standard deviations of modi-
fied probabilities decreased with increased numbers of runs.
However, beyond fifty runs, the magnitude of these reduc-
tions was small. This indicates that stability was reached,
and that random variation was only slightly reduced by
increasing the numbers of runs. (3) As more events were
included in the analysis set, no notable changes appeared
in the average standard deviations obtained. This indicates
that the numbers of runs does not have to increase as the
number of events increases. (4) Furthermore, Johnson observed
that while it is possible to obtain significant probability
shifts from a statistical standpoint, there is no assurance
that such shifts are significant from a policy standpoint
[Ref . 40, p. 127-130]
.
D. CROSS- IMPACT ANALYSIS SYMBOLOGY
The different cross-impact approaches, besides using
various terms to describe basic concepts, have also employed
different symbologies in their demonstrations. This section
is presented in an attempt to establish a consistent symbology
for cross-impact computations. This will simplify comparing
the different cross-impact approaches in the next chapter.
1. Event Set Specification
Let A, B, C, ... N be events which could develop from
present circumstances, which seem to be related to each
other (i.e., are coupled as previously described), and are
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important to some problem being considered. These events
were selected and formulated in accordance with the rules
specified previously. Designating A as event one (E, ) , B
as event two (E^), etc., produces a set of events {E, , E^,
^ 12
E^ , . . . , ill s .
2. Estimate Initial Probabilities
Each event (E^^ through E ) has an associated initial
probability of occurring by some specified time in the
future based on the present situation. It is possible for
experts to estimate this probability (i.e., if present
developments continue without change, the probability A, (E,
)
will occur by time T is x) . Designate this probability (of
event A) as P (E-, ) and similarly for all events in the set
{P(E^), P(E2), P(E3), ..., P(E^)}. Or as P^ for i = 1,2,





The next step is to estimate the effect on the other
events of the occurrence of any one event (i.e., if event
B is certain to occur what is the new probability event A
will occur?). P(E-,|E2) or Pdjj) for i,j = 1,2,3, ...,n
and j 7^ i. These estimates are obtained for each possible







The result from this series of estimates may then be
arranged in an n by n matrix. Since the impact of an event
on itself obviously has no meaning, the diagonal cell by
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convention contains the events' initial probability. The
2
matrix thus contains all n required estimates.
FIGURE 1
BASIC CROSS- IMPACT MATRIX
the effect on
this event is
EVENT A B C N
if this A P(E^) P(E2 E^) P(E3 E^) P(E^ E^)
occurs
P(E^ E^) P(E2) P(E3 E^) P(E„ Ej)
C P(E^ E3) P(E2 E3) P(E3) P(E^ E3)
N P(E, E^)
1 n
P(E2 E^) P(E^ E )
3 n
P(E^)
Note that P(E, |e„) is not necessarily equal to P(E |E,).
The matrix is then manipulated using the Monte Carlo
procedure previously described, or some other procedure may
be substituted. Using numerous runs permits computing
revised initial probabilities for each event based on its
frequency of occurrence during the runs.
PME„)
# times E occurred
n
# runs conducted
E. OUTPUTS AND APPLICATIONS
This section will review the types of analyses conducted
using the technique and their possible applications. The
technique's proponents have demonstrated several types of

analyses using the data generated by the technique. Many
applications claimed for these outputs seem to address
effectively the difficulties identified with problem solving
in the social sciences. These claims seem plausable in the
context of the authors' arguments, however, final judgment
on the technique's utility must be reserved until the
claims can be verified with data from experiments or real
world applications. These outputs and their supporting
rationale will be described below, along with proposed
applications. Specific procedures for conducting these
analyses will be presented in the next chapter which
develops the major cross-impact analysis approaches.
One often cited potential for the technique is the
learning experience it provides. Due to its systematic
approach, estimators are forced to develop and clarify
their opinions regarding the causal linkages coupling
potential developments in a field or several fields into a
consistent picture [Ref . 33] . Estimators must be explicit
when structuring their responses, and are forced to con-
sider related impacts and overall consistency. This aids in
organizing and evaluating an individual's views on a com-
plex problem [Ref. 36].
Manipulating the matrix through the Monte Carlo process,
or other procedures (other procedures will be discussed
during the review of specific cross-impact approaches) , pro-
duces event sequence scenarios which indicate the various
ways in which a given situation might evolve. As used in

cross-impact analysis the term scenario has a very specific
connotation. A scenario refers to the event outcome deci-
sion (either occurrence or non-occurrenc) made when the
estimates are manipulated, and the sequence in which the
events are decided. For a six event set a possible scenario
would be depicted in the following manner:
(1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1,)
where events 1,4,5, and 6 occurred, and events 2 and 3 did
not. In this study, subsequent discussions of the cross-
impact methodology, of specific cross-impact approaches, and
of the study's demonstration results will use the term
scenario (or, event sequence scenario) to refer to these
event occurrence chains.
Scenario generation provides decision-makers a background
against which policy options may be evaluated. By speci-
fying scenarios, and evaluating them using subjective event
importance ratings, it might be possible to identify obscure
Sarin discusses scenario generation and its importance
[Ref . 38] . For a set of n events there are 2^ possible
scenarios, each with an associated scenario probability,
P (x ) . Sarin proposes a method for computing these scenario
probabilities from expert estimates. The scenario probabili-
ties may also be computed, as were the revised initial event
probabilities, through the Monte Carlo process. Each Monte
Carlo run produces one scenario, P (x ) for that scenario is
computed by the frequency that it occurs divided by the
number of scenarios generated.
# X produced
^^^n^ " # runs
However, this requires that many Monte Carlo runs be conducted
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but important situations from among the vast number of
possibilities [Ref
. 33] . Used alone, scenario generation
at least indicates to decision-makers the likely consequences
of inaction. The scenario output is the technique's major
tool in its most interesting application, policy analysis.
Through comparing the scenarios (produced by recording
event sequence outcomes during a Monte Carlo simulation) to
the cross-impact matrix it is possible to identify "critical"
events which make a considerable difference in outcomes [Ref.
28]. This causal analysis also provides "a means of gaining
insight into key branch points and items on which current
actions and policies should be focused in order to increase
the likelihood of achieving a desired outcome." [Ref. 33,
p. 45]
.
By examining the cross-impact matrix with the scenarios
it is also possible to identify possible "side effects" pro-
duced by the decision under consideration. This examination
could aid the decision-maker in two ways. First, a nagging
problem which faces decision-makers is to identify additional
problems which may arise further down the line caused by
their attempts to respond to the immediate problem situation.
Determining a decision's possible side effects may reveal
unanticipated developments which might stem from a particular
situation or a particular policy option.
A second advantage offered by exploring a decision's
side effects is that the examination may indicate less
expensive means of attaining goals through investment in
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high-payoff areas which may have seemed unrelated [Ref. 26,
p. 101], This advantage is reflected in attempts to use
cross-impact analysis to evaluate resource allocation strat-
egies. Gordon suggested resource allocation strategies could
be tested by adjusting the initial probability estimates for
one or several events to reflect policy decisions in order to
improve or inhibit their likelihood. These adjustments are
then manipulated as was the original matrix, and the output
examined to determine the policy decision's effect on the
various scenario probabilities observed [Ref. 24] . This
process is termed sensitivity analysis, and can be used to
explore the effects caused by changes in problem configuration
Further cross-impact analysis applications derive from
using the technique to model the relationships operative in
a given situation [Ref. 4]. Enzer demonstrates that the
matrix may be used to determine an event's dominance and
sensitivity. In his approach, the sum of the absolute values
in a matrix row can be interpreted as a measure of the magni-
tude of the impact one event's occurrence has on the occur-
rence likelihood of all other events (its dominance) [Ref. 27,
p. 54], As a minimum, this identifies the events which have
the greatest and least effect, relatively, on the situation.
Those events with the greatest overall effects are prime
candidates for intervention through resource allocation.
Event sensitivity is computed from the algebraic sum
of the matrix column values. This is a measure indicating
how responsive an event is to the other events in the set
[Ref. 27, p. 54]. It reveals events which may be susceptible
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to change through secondary intervention. It could also
indicate those events which most readily indicate changes in
the system, and hence, should comprise the components of a
monitoring mechanism.
By focusing on the opinion spread registered by the
experts, Enzer develops an uncertainty measure reflecting the
degree of estimator uncertainty concerning the cross-impacts.
This is derived for each event by determining the distance
between the upper quartile and lower quartile estimate values
[Ref
. 27, p. 54] . This "uncertainty" measure also highlights
the level of agreement among the experts, and can be inter-
preted as a "confidence" measure. Such information would be
an aid in resource allocation, allowing decision-makers to
avoid investing effort in influencing an event whose impact
was highly uncertain. If subjective estimates regarding an
event's importance and desirability are obtained with the
probability estimates more elaborate analyses are possible.
These could aid decision-makers in identifying desirable actions
and areas warranting further investigation [Ref. 27, p. 57].
The cross-impact technique also appears amenable to mani-
pulation with digraph theory, and other techniques used in
studies of individual and organizational information process-
ing (esp. information theory). Digraph theory uses binary
matrix entries to trace third- and fourth-level interrelation-
1
8
ships among events. Turoff incorporated information theory
18
The principles and methods of digraph theory are
presented in Harary , et al . [Ref. 42]. Axelrod [Ref. 43], and
Bonham, et al. [Refs. 44 and 4 5] have attempted to apply digraph
theory to international relations theory and problems.
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in his cross-impact approach to relate estimates for
occurrence and non-occurrence [Ref . 36]
.
F. RATIONALE FOR SELECTING CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS
The preceding discussion has revealed several aspects of
cross-impact analysis which make it attractive as a decision-
aiding methodology for crisis situations. The technique's
advantages will be summarized below as justification for
selecting cross-impact analysis for demonstration and evalu-
ation in this project. Specific aspects of the technique
discussed include: (1) its subjective method of evaluation,
(2) its systematic approach, (3) its flexibility, (4) its
demonstrated application to policy analysis, and (5) its
potential utility as a learning tool.
1. Subjective
Using expert's subjective evaluations precludes the
need for a formal theory relating crisis elements, national
interests, and policy options. The procedure takes into
account the perceptions and accumulated knowledge of experts
and decision-makers (which is not easily transferred) and
uses them to process and interpret imprecise information.
It minimizes the need to collect precise data on numerous,
inadequately understood indicators, especially in situations
19
where time and stored information is limited.
19
This is not intended to suggest that theory construction
and indicator development are not important. As noted in
Chapter One, these approaches are required for system moni-
toring, furthermore, they are necessary to achieve precision
in the social sciences as indicated by Rossenau [Ref. 46]
.
What is intended is to establish the current need for sub-





Because the technique is systematic in its approach,
it encourages the consideration of the numerous interactions
which could be overlooked in situations involving short response
time and stress. In addition, it proceeds logically from
problem identification through the selection of policy options.
The subjective estimates obtained during the evaluation process
are retained so the entire analysis can be replicated at will,
rather than being lost after the crisis has passed.
Finally, because it is a systematic procedure cross-
impact analysis may be conducted using a computer. Most
applications demonstrated, especially those presented by
Mitchell and Tydeman, Turoff, and Sarin [Refs. 29, 36, and
38] , have utilized or advocated an interactive computer
system for querying experts. This capability increases
analysis speed and flexibility, both of which are desirable
for a decision-aid in crisis situations.
3. Flexibility
Cross-impact analysis is not constrained by data
requirements to evaluating only a few empirically quantifiable
variables. The variables used in the technique are obtained
from experts' perceptions concerning a specific problem. If,
while obtaining subjective probability estimates, it becomes
apparent some important aspect of the problem has been
omitted it is possible to include it in the event set. This
capability is particularly useful in analyzing a crisis
situation involving uncertainty and incomplete inf02nnation.
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It allows the event set to be modified in response to
changing circumstances. Such "last minute" modifications
are possible because the values used in the analysis are
subjective, and can be easily revised or expanded.
Using subjective judgments also permits the approach
to address any problem for which an appropriate event set
can be specified. This flexibility is evidenced by the broad
spectrum of problems to which the technique has been applied.
4 . Demonstrated Applications
Several cross-impact studies have been conducted in
situations relevant to policy analysis. Heuer describes one
such study in reviewing CIA efforts to use quantitative
techniques to analyze policy relevant situations [Ref. 41].
The approach is future oriented and addresses the potential
evolution of a current situation. Thus, cross-impact analysis
attempts to be predictive, conducts sensitivity analysis, and
indicates degrees of uncertainty. Other developers have
applied the methodology to problems of evaluating transporta-
tion alternatives
,
population trends , and energy options
[Refs. 26, 33, and 47], Changing values and objectives are
implicitly considered by using subjective estimates or may
be explicitly stated in the cross-impact matrix. Finally,
once the estimates ' form and meaning are understood the
procedure may be used by anyone. For these reasons, cross-
impact analysis enhances the process of analyzing a situation




Since respondent estimates can be retained, the
technique can help close the feedback loop involved in
assessing the direction in which a situation is moving. This
can be accomplished by comparing estimates obtained over time
(T, - T^)
.
If a policy has been implemented between T, and T»,
then the comparison tests the policy's success.
By monitoring the emergence of cross-impact matrices
over time, it might be possible to gain insight into how
organizations structure their knowledge about the environm.ent
.
Thus, a series of matrices, taken from a particular situation,




The preceding overview highlighted cross-impact analysis'
potential applicability as a policy tool. However, the
various conceptual problems identified here and by the tech-
nique's developers have produced several alternative cross-
impact approaches, each advancing different methods to deal
with the technique's conceptual problems, and leading to
confusion regarding which variation of the technique is the
best to operationalize
.
Due to the confusion, selecting a variation for extension
as a crisis decision-aid should be approached systematically
using consistent evaluation criteria. These criteria should
address each variation's primary components, including its
assumptions, underlying rationale, and implications. Specific
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implementation problems should be evaluated by examining
information requirements, computational procedures, and
methodological approach. The goal is to select a practicable
approach and develop it into a crisis decision-aid.
In developing consistent evaluation criteria, several
considerations must be kept in mind. These stem from the
characteristics defining crisis, and this project's time and
computational resource limitations. Based on these considera-
tions, discussed in the first chapter, the following criteria
were formulated for comparing the various cross-impact approaches
1. Is the event formulation scope adequate ? This
refers to the subject area addressed by the event set. In the
intended analysis, events must cover such concepts as "national
interests" threatened, and specific "policy options" available.
2. Can events be rated on importance/desirability ?
The need for such subjective estimates in sensitivity analysis
and event set selection has been indicated. This refers to
whether or not the specific technique includes procedures for
obtaining and using such estimates.
3
.
What types of analysis can be performed using the
technique ?
4 Is the technique computer adaptable ?
5. Are the estimated relationships clearly formulated ?
This refers to whether or not the procedure used to obtain
estimates, and the questions asked, are understood by the
respondents. Are the respondents asked for estimates they





Are the estimates consistent, or can consistency
be obtained ? This refers to the need for estimates which can
be manipulated using a systematic, rigorous, methodology.
"7. What algorithm is used to manipulate the estimates ?
This refers to the procedure by which the cross-impacts are
"taken into account" [Ref. 34, p. 342] , and how it is structured.
8. Is the procedure logical/justifiable ? This
refers to the assumptions made in adopting the algorithm, are
they reasonable and what limitations do they impose?
9. How is consistency obtained ? This refers to the
computational procedure for checking consistency and revising
estimates into a consistent set.
10
.
How are scenarios generated ? This refers to the
procedure used to develop event sequence scenarios, how complex
it is and whether or not it provides a ranking system.
11. How many estimates does the technique require ?
12. What types of computation are performed ? This
refers to the complexity of the calculations. Are they
algebraic, quadratic, differentials, or linear programs?
13 How many terms are involved in each formula ?
14 How many separate calculations are required ?
This refers to what computational steps are required for
estimate manipulation, checking consistency, scenario
generation and analysis.
These last four criteria are proposed in order to
identify an approach which can be demonstrated using limited
computational facilities. This study will replicate the
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selected approach manually, therefore, the number and
complexity of estimates and computations must be kept to
a manageable number.
H. CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented a broad overview of cross-
impact analysis, identifying its basic concepts and potential
j
applications. Since there are a number of alternative
approaches to implementing the methodology a set of evaluation
criteria was developed to use in selecting an approach for
operationalization. The next chapter will review the major
j cross-impact approaches, select one for demonstration, and
extend it to deal with a crisis situation.
Subsequent chapters will discuss the implementation
procedure used, identify the problems encountered in opera-
tionalizing the selected approach, and present the demon-
stration results. In the final chapter, these results and
the implementation experience will be used to evaluate the
j




III. THE MAJOR CROSS-IMPACT APPROACHES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will identify and evaluate the major appro-
aches to cross-impact analysis using the evaluation criteria
developed in the preceding chapter. Four major approaches
will be described and discussed in terms of their basic
assumptions, procedures and outputs. In addition, three
ancillary approaches which were felt to be too complex for
demonstration will be reviewed briefly. The four major
approaches will then be compared using the evaluation cri-
teria, and one will be selected for demonstration and evalua-
tion as a possible crisis decision-aid. The selection pro-
cess will also highlight possible problems in operationalizing
the selected approach.
Demonstrating the selected approach in a hypothetical
policy relevant, crisis situation may require that it be
extended to address specific problems inherent in such
situations. These problems include short response time,
and evaluating specific policy options. Possible extensions
to cross-impact analysis will be developed once an approach
has been selected.
B. THE BASIC APPROACH (GORDON)
The concept of cross-impact analysis was introduced by
Gordon and Hayward in 1968 [Ref. 26]. As previously noted,







Its first application was in a forecasting
game, developed for the Kaiser Corporation, which tested
resource allocation strategies [Ref. 24]
.
1. Assumptions
Cross-impact analysis is based on two assumptions.
In response to the Delphi criticism, the developers hypothe-
sized that most events are connected in some way. Further,
they felt that it is possible to estimate these connections
subjectively as to mode (enhancing or inhibiting) , strength
(amount of influence) , and time lag (length of time required
for effect to be felt) [Ref. 26, p. 101-4].^°
Given that linkages existed and could be estimated,
the developers next addressed how the impacts worked, or
how one event's occurrence D , (E . ) , changed a second event's
D ,(E.) , occurrence probability. They assumed each event




. ) ^ by a specific date. The change in probability
P' ,(P'.)/ caused by another event's occurrence was assumed
n 1 ^
to be a function of mode, strength, and time lag. However,
an event's failure to occur (non-occurrence) was assumed to
have no effect on the remaining probabilities.
on
These relationships are more complete than indicated
here. Gordon realized that the "connections are subtle
and vary widely in strength, [sic] Composed of at least two
major elements; probabilities of feasibility (P^) and pursuit




stated mathematically, they assumed: [Ref. 26,
p. 104] .




M = estimated Mode
t . = time in the future E . occurs
D 3
S = estimated strength
t = time in the future for which probabilities
are being estimated
The relationship between events was assumed to be quadratic
[Ref. 26, p. 105],
P ' . = aP
.
^ + bP . + c1 11
By assuming known end conditions:
when P . = then P
'
^ =
P. = 1 p', = i
and if t. = t (no time lag) P^ ^
^'i
And assuming the mode, strength, and time effects are









k = ±1 (Mode)
S = number between and 1 (smaller representing
weaker effect)
Therefore, in the inhibiting case,
-1 < a <
and enchancing
< a < 1
this produces:
t - t . ^ t - t.
P' . = kS —J- P/ + [1 -kS —r—^]P-1 t 1 t 1
2. Procedure
This equation was demonstrated in two applications,
a historical context and a futures context. In these
demonstrations, the estimates were made by the experimenters
The historical problem examined the Minuteman deployment
decision, the future problem examined transportation develop-
ments in light of technological advances and changing
societal attitudes [Ref . 26]
.
In both cases the procedure began by specifying
relevant events and developments to be examined. These
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events were obtained through literature searches, expert
interviews, and the analysts' own opinions.
The next step was to estimate the initial proba-
bilities and occurrence dates for each event. An event
matrix was then constructed, and the potential interactions
between each event and every other event were estimated.
These estimates assessed both the interaction's mode
and its strength. They were made by assuming one event was
certain to occur, and then predicting its impact on each
remaining event. These values ranged from -1.0 to +1.0,
and made up the matrix body. Upon reviewing the individual
event pair interactions certain "predecessor-successor"
relationships were apparent to the experimenters. In the
subsequent manipulation, events which had to be predecessors
21
were evaluated first.
A computer was programmed with the quadratic
relationship and the "Monte Carlo" procedure used to manipu-
late the matrix. If an event was decided to occur, its
impact was calculated from its cross-impacts with each
other event using the quadratic equation, and the remaining
events' initial probabilities were adjusted accordingly.
If non-occurrence was decided then the remaining probabilities
2
1
In the matrix, these relationships were indicated by
appending a second digit to the interaction values. CO =
immaterial, 1 = likely predecessor, 2 = necessary predecessor)




were not changed. The computer run was conducted one thou-
sand times so that "revised" probabilities could be computed
for each event based on its occurrence frequency [Ref. 26,
p. 108] .
3. Analyses Performed
Using this procedure, Gordon and Hayward demonstrated
that four potentially useful analytical methods could be
developed from the initial matrix. These were: (1) final
probability rankings, (2) probability shifts, (3) tracing
causal effects, and (4) scenario sensitivity analysis.
Ranking by final probability produced a possible
event sequence outcome scenario. In the example this was
felt to be logically consistent (plausable) . However, the
developers realized it was no more consistent than other
possible scenarios. (Alternative scenarios could be obtained
by recording the "decisions" made in each computer run using
for non-occurrence and 1 for occurrence.) [Ref. 26, p. 108]
The ranking by probability shift (difference between
p. and P'.) was used to identify the events most affected
by the suspected interactions. In other words; "the item
[event] which had the highest probability shift could be
expected to be the one most influenced by the external
events depicted by the remainder of the list." [Ref. 26,
p. 108]
.
In their forecasting analysis, the developers
attempted to use the matrix to trace through the reasons
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for an event's resulting probability shift. For example
they concluded that:
Within the groups of items [events]
describing future transportation
modes, fast sub-surface trains
showed the highest probability
gain, suggesting that changing
customer preferences, social
customs, and technological
innovations might favor this role.
[Ref. 26, p. 113]
.
In essence, this is an elaborate way to state the
probability shift conclusion, and later cross-impact developers
would attempt to be more explicit in tracing causal effects.
The developers also used their model to examine the
potential effects of conscious policy decisions. Policy
decisions were interpreted as decisions to allocate re-
sources to making a particular event or set of events more
likely. Such a decision was reflected by arbitrarily raising
the initial probabilities for those events. The policy
decision's results were then indicated by manipulating the
matrix using the new initial values and comparing the
effects produced, on the event sequence scenarios, with the
initial run [Ref. 26, p. 115].
4 . Critique
Gordon and Hayward recognized that their approach
had several weaknesses. These would be expounded upon by
later reviewers. The quadratic relationship had been selected
due to its intuitive appeal and for convenience, however,
the authors were not insistent that it be used. They
suggested that other possible foirms be examined. Gordon
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and Hayward also recognized that there was little justifi-
cation for assuming mode, strength, and time lag acted
linearly. A logistic function was recommended as being more
appropriate. The assumed non-effect of non-occurrence was
felt to be an oversimplification which could be easily over-
I
come. Finally, in future applications the developers pro-
posed that estimates be obtained by a consensus-building
technique such as Delphi [Ref. 26, p. 115].
One of Gordon and Hayward ' s critics, Enzer, criticized
the quadratic adjustment assumption on the basis that it
arbitrarily restricted the possible domain of change in
PV. The greatest absolute change in P. could occur only
[
when P^ = 50%. The quadratic did not allow;
. .
. the occurrence of one event to
have a large positive absolute
impact on an event whose initial
probability is very low, or a large
negative absolute impact on an
event whose initial probability
is very high. [Ref. 35, p. 352].
He notes that although this appears to violate intuitive
thinking, it did prevent P' . from reaching unity or becoming
negative.
Enzer also explained the limitations produced by
ignoring an event's non-occurrence. He felt that failing
to consider non-occurrence leads to ambiguity in defining
the initial probabilities. This is because any cross-impact
effects which may have been implicitly included in estimating
the initial probabilities are not removed. However, Enzer
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noted that it may be conceptually difficult to estimate
the effect of non-occurrence [Ref. 27, p. 59].
In their estimation of the interrelationships, Enzer
felt that Gordon and Hayward had not adequately defined the
cross-impact factors [Ref. 21, p. 53] . This problem relates
to how estimator responses should be interpreted, as dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter. Two other critics, Mitchell
and Tydeman, indicated this problem's implications when they
observed that Gordon and Harward ' s "...procedure contains
no mechanism to ensure that basic pairwise probability
relationships remained intact." [Ref. 29, p. 134],
The basic approach had other problems associated
with its use. Dalkey points out that relative likeli-
hoods for individual event sequences (scenarios) could
not be assessed directly. This was because only binary
interactions were considered [Ref. 3 4] .
To make scenario computation
useful it will be necessary
either to obtain estimates of
higher order interactions or
find a more logically correct
assumption concerning them
[Ref. 34, p. 350]
.
Another problem noted by Mitchell and Tydemand was that the
approach lacked an uncertainty measure with which to evaluate
the expert's opinions [Ref. 29, p. 134]. Also, as discussed
in Chapter Two, Johnson challenged the assumption that proba-
bility shifts which were significant from a statistical stand-





C. MODIFICATIONS TO THE BASIC APPROACH (ENZER)
In two successive cross-impact analysis applications
Enzer attempted to overcome some of the problems discussed
above [Refs. 27 and 33]. In his earlier work Enzer retained
the basic method's approach to quantifying event interactions,
to using a quadratic manipulation, and to ignoring non-
occurrence. The major innovation was that he used the
Delphi technique to obtain his event set and subjective
estimates. This allowed him to extend the analyses he
could perform [Ref . 27]
.
By using the Delphi technique Enzer was able to retain
the estimators' opinion spread for each specific relationship
examined. Opinion spread is defined as the range between
the upper quartile and lower quartile response values, or
one standard deviation above and below the: mean value. With
this information Enzer was able to conduct two analyses more
systematically than Gordon and Hayward had. Enzer demon-
strated that the mean response values could be used to iden-
tify dominant and sensitive events before their probability
shifts were determined. In addition, the estimator's opinion
spread could be used to indicate estimator uncertainty
concerning the potential interactions.
An event's dominance was determined by summing the
absolute values contained in a matrix row. Since these
represented an event's impact on the other events, this
measure was used to identify the events with the greatest
overall impact. Event sensitivity was measured by alge-
braically summing the column values. These values represented
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the degree to which all other events influenced a single
event's occurrence probability. This measure was used
to identify the events which responded most readily to
changes in the problem situation.
The opinion spread in a row indicates the estimator's
uncertainty regarding how an event's occurrence impacts
the other events. The opinion spread in a column indicates
the uncertainty concerning how an event is affected by
the other events [Ref. 27, p. 55].
In addition to the standard estimates, Enzer elicited
respondents' opinions concerning each event's importance.
He suggested that these importance ratings, in conjunction
with the above measures, can aid in identifying desirable
events for resource allocation, and for selecting events
to be used in sensitivity analysis. In this case, an important
event which is insensitive to the others would require direct
intervention, sensitive events might benefit from indirect
action, and highly uncertain relationships would require
closer analysis and evaluation before a decision could be
made [Ref. 27, p. 57].
Although it introduced an uncertainty measure, and
permitted more exact causal analysis Enzer ' s approach
suffered from many of the same problems associated with
the Gordon and Hayward method. These recurring problems
included: the use of the quadratic manipulation, ignoring
non-occurrence, and determining how to interpret the
respondent's estimates. Furthermore, the Delphi technique.
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while extending the analysis, has some inherent problems.
Fischer, et. al. cite studies which suggest that the Delphi
technique (where individuals make estimates; receive anony-
mous feedback about the estimates of other group members;
and make additional estimates based on the feedback) is a
poor way to elicit expert opinion. The studies reviewed in
Fischer, et. al. indicate that the best procedure to elicit
expert opinion uses a slightly different approach. The
recommended procedure is to have the experts make individual
estimates; then, bring the group together and allow the
experts to discuss their estimates face to face; and finally,
have the experts make a second set of individual estimates
[Ref . 13, p. 55]
.
Enzer's second application introduced more fundamental
changes to the Gordon and Hayward method. Enzer abandoned
the quadratic manipulation, and introduced the concepts of
"likelihood ratios" and "constant change of odds" to handle
the procedure of manipulating estimates. In this approach,
estimates were elicited as changes in probability and non-
occurrence was considered. Enzer also attempted to resolve
estimate inconsistencies [Ref. 33] .
1. Assumptions
Using an event's importance rating, it was possible
for Enzer to limit the number of events to be included in
the analysis. Selecting the most important events avoided
the necessity to specify the entire environment, thereby.
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simplifying the analysis. However, this increased the
complexity of the estimation process.
Interrelationships were estimated in terms of the
change in likelihood of one event (E.) produced by another
event's (E
.
) occurrence. This was defined as P(ilj). The
effect of non-occurrence could also be estimated in the same
way, and was defined as P(ilj). If this second estimate was
too dififcult for respondents to provide it could be calcu-
lated using a standard probability relationship [Ref. 33,
p. 38] :
P(i) = P(j)P(ilj) + (1 -P(j)) (Pi|J))
These values were then used to compute the likelihood
(cross-impact) ratio for each event pair [Ref. 34, p. 350]
:
ij P(j) 1 -P(j ji;
This became the factor by which the initial occurrence
probabilities were multiplied when an event's occurrence
or non-occurrence was decided. Using this ratio expanded
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the domain of change possible for an event's initial
22probability.
To track the many changes in probability produced
by the occurrence or non-occurrence of numerous events,




the judgment concerning the
impact on Event A of the occurr-
ence of Event B is independent of
the exact probability of occurr-
ence of Event A, and that when-
ever Event A is preceded by the
occurrence of Event B the change
in likelihood of occurrence of
Event A is known from the initial
input. [Ref. 33, p. 41].
This means that once the interaction between two events CA
and B) has been estimated, its value is not changed if
another event (C) occurs before B and changes event A's
initial probability. As long as B occurs before A it will
impact A's current probability to the same degree that it
was believed to impact A's initial probability.
22As Enzer explains in his earlier work:
Changes in probability in the form of quanti-
tative ratios opens the domain to the widest
range of possibilities. Several of these
are presented in Figure 6 in a foirm comparable
with the previous figure. From Figure 6 it
can be seen that an event whose initial proba-
bility was 20% could, if impacted by an
event that increased its likelihood by a
factor of 20, be raised to 83%. When the
quadratic is used, the maximum positive impact
for an event with an initial probability of
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In order to assure pairwise consistency was maintained
in the estimates Enzer adopted the following axioms [Ref. 33,
p. 37] :
1. The initial probabilities of event pairs
impose limits on the values of the impacted
probabilities for that pair.
2. For any event pair, specification of the
initial probabilities and one set of
impacted probabilities (occurrence or
non-occurrence) fixes the remaining set.
Thus, the relationship used to calculate non-occurrence could
also be used to check for consistency. A simply boundary
rule could then be applied to resolve inconsistencies.
Pairwise consistency is required when dealing with proba-
bility estimates to insure the calculated probabilities do
not exceed unity or become negative. Such values would be
meaningless in probabilistic terms.
In applying this boundary rule Enzer assumed that the
intention indicated by the respondents ' estimates were
correct, but that their actual values were incorrect. The
boundary rule then makes the least adjustment required to
restore consistency. For example, if a value given for
P(i|j) in conjunction with those given for P(i) and P(j) pro-
duced a computed value for P(i|j) which was <0 or >1, then
it was inconsistent. A computer would set the value of
P(i!J) = 1 or as required, and recompute P(ilj) [Ref. 33,
p. 38].
2 . Procedure
Enzer 's approach followed the procedure developed by
Gordon and Hayward. Candidate events for inclusion in the
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analysis were obtained from a Delphi exercise. In order
to limit the event set size, only those events considered
most important (by subjective rating) were included.
The respondents were then asked to estimate each
event's initial probability of occurring by a specified
date, considering an environment which might evolve from
the present circumstances without conscious human interven-
tion to change the course of events. They were then asked
to rate each event's desirability. This rating included two
subjective estimates; the desirability of an event to the
environmental aspect being considered (+ or -) , and its
impact on that environmental aspect should the event occur
(0 = weak to 10 = strong) [Ref. 33, p. 46]. This desira-
bility rating seems to relate to subjectively assessing
whether an event enhances or inhibits policy goals, or
whether an event influences a situation in a direction
desired by the decision unit.
The respondents were next asked to assess the inter-
relationships between events. They provided the new likeli-
hood of occurrence for each event given each other event's
occurrence Cand non-occurrence if possible, otherwise this
value was computed) . The estimates were then checked for
consistency and revised as necessary using the boundary
rule.
Likelihood ratios were then computed to fill in
the matrix, and the estimates manipulated as in the basic





With this approach Enzer was able to perforin all
the analyses permitted by the basic approach, including:
1. determining even sensitivity and dominance
2. scenario generation
3. exploring causal relationships
4. conducting scenario sensitivity analysis
In addition he had obtained an indication of respon-
dent uncertainty using opinion spread. Rating events by
desirability allowed selected events to be included in
the sensitivity analysis. It also permitted choosing the
more desirable events as subjects for testing resource
allocation strategies.
Furthermore, desirability ratings provided criteria
with which specific event sequence scenarios could be eval-
uated. Using these criteria, it was possible to determine





This approach overcame several difficulties asso-
ciated with the basic approach, specifically it
1. considered non-occurrence
2. eliminated the quadratic assumption'
3
.
demonstrated that expert opinions could
be used in analyzing complex situations
4. provided an uncertainty measure for
evaluating estimates
Nevertheless, several problems still remain.
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It was still difficult to identify significant
probability shifts, although the desirability/impact and
importance ratings had reduced the necessity for this
determination. The interrelationships considered were
still only binary, and even with desirability ratings it
was still not possible to determine the most probable scen-
arios. Finally, it was still unclear what the respondents
meant when they provided interaction estimates.
This last problem seems to have been, if anything,
confounded by Enzer's attempt to introduce classical proba-
tility relationships. As Mitchell and Tydeman observed:
A fundamental difficulty with cross-
impact analysis is to determine what
respondents actually mean whn they
answer the conditional probability
questions normally posed. Results of
studies currently in progress indicate
that (1) participants are frequently
confused and unsure of the interpretation
of such questions, and (2) respondents
often interpret the question in terms
of time-dependent conditional probability
statements , namely ' If event A occurred
(first) , what is the probability of B
occurring?' [Ref. 29, p. 133].
In addition, introducing conditional probability
relationships stimulated the use of classical probability
theory in determining estimate consistency. Also, Jackson
and Lawton observe that the classical probability equation
used to calculate non-occurrence and test consistency could
also be used to derive half the matrix entries once the other
half had been specified [Ref. 37, p. 265].
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Mitchell and Tydeman point out that, if the cross-
impact estimates are interpreted as being time-dependent,
Enzer's approach may not be valid.
. .
.
the standard observation that
P(A)P(b|A) = P(B)P(A|b) beomces,
with the inclusion of time-dependence
P(A)PtB|A^.^^^) (=) P(B)P(A|B^.^^^).
In this restatement equality is not
guaranteed - in fact, it would be
pure coincidence other than when
events A and B were independent.
[Ref . 29, p. 135]
.
The consistency question led Enzer and Alter to
address using Bayesian probability in cross-impact analysis.
They suggested that confusion in interpretation was caused
because the early approaches [Ref. 39, p. 231]:
1. Described future events with no real
sense of time sequence.
2. Used a data collection technique which
blurred the distinction between correla-
tion and causality.
They concluded that conditional probabilities were
not directly applicable to causal situations [Ref. 39, p. 237]
This conclusion also had been reached in 1972 by Turoff
who proposed an alternative approach to cross-impact
analysis [Ref. 36]
.
D. ASSUMED CONSISTENCY (TUROFF) APPROACH
Turoff attempted to accomplish several goals with his
approach. One was to develop a method which could determine
the causal impact of potential events not specified in the
event set. He also wished to establish some relationship
between an event's occurrence lilcelihood and the effort
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invested in either promoting or preventing the event.
In presenting his approach Turoff acknowledged that
because higher order interactions are difficult to esti-
2mate, "we in effect ignore terms of P or greater, hoping
that the three- or four-way interactions are small." [Ref. 36,
p. 326]. Nevertheless, Turoff did attempt to derive a
measure of the strength of these higher order interactions.
1. Assumptions
Turoff 's approach was based primarily on the assump-
tion that;
Given a set of evnets which may or
may not occur over an interval of
time, we assume that an individual
asked to estimate the probability
of occurrence of each event will
supply a 'consistent' set of
estimates [Ref. 36, p. 317] .
This assumption effectively removed the requirement to
check estimate consistency. Instead estimates were obtained
using an interactive computer program. In this, manner the
respondent was shown the results produced by his estimates,
and allowed to revise them at will until he felt the model
they produced met his expectations.
A second assumption in this approach is founded on
information theory, which is used to calculate cross-impact
factors (C. .) from estimates used to derive values for the
effect of occurrence (R. )/ and non-occurrence (S . . ) for
each event. The assumption was that "if a correlation
exists between R. and S. . is is such as to maximize the
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added information." [Ref. 36, p. 324]. The effect of
this relationship can be shown simply.








t^^^ dS^ = z
and p. = R£+S
l+ £
R+S R+£S „
This behaves physically as one
would desire, for if P . is close
to one, then a very large change
in R is necessary to make a small
change in S. Conversely, if P.
is close to zero, a very large-^
change in S is necessary to pro-
duce a small change in R. Also
when P- = 1/2 the relative change
in R and S is equal. [Ref. 36, p. 322].
Finally, a likelihood measure is used in expressing
the probability that an event occurs, called its occurrence
ratio (t ) . This measure is similar to Enzer's likelihood
ratio. Under assumed occurrence or non-occurrence it
ranges from +°= to --» [Ref. 36, p. 319]. The occurrence
ratio is assumed to be directly proportional to a measure
of effort, or [Ref. 36, p. 320]:
T





•. = the occurrence ratio of event i.
and
T
E. = the total amount of effort expended in
either bringing about or preventing "iIf J II
Assuming that estimators are consistent, the assumed
maximization of added information allows a difference equa-
tion to be used for cases in which new information is
received (i.e., an event's occurrence or non-occurrence
becomes certain) [Ref. 36, p. 318]. Assuming certain
occurrence (P = 1) , then, the approach defines R. . = P^^,
where R. . is the probability of the i event given that j
is certain to occur. Turoff then derives a cross-impact
factor (occurrence ratio) for occurrence [Ref. 36, p. 321,
(eq. 19) ] .
C . = T-4r— [djR. . - ^P . ]
2.J 1-P . ^ 1] ^ 1
Assuming certain non-occurrence (P . = 0) , then, the proba-
bility of the i event given that the j event is certain
to not occur is defined similarly, S^. = Pj_- •^ cross-impact
for non-occurrence is derived [Ref. 36, p. 321, (eq. 21)].
C. . = =i-[*P. - 4)S. . ]
1.1 P . ^ 1 ID
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Combining these two factors produces [Ref. 36, p. 3 21,
(eq. 22)],
C. . = (^R. . - <^S. .in i: ID
Obtaining values for all the C. .'s permits calculating
y^, a term assumed to be a function of the unknown variables
not specified in the event set [Ref. 36, p. 321, (eq. 23)]




By assuming the most favorable case for event i's occurrence,
p.
,
and the least favorable case, P.
, two y.'s can be
f , u
computed, y. and y. . This permits measuring explicitly
the inaccuracy caused by ignoring higher order interactions
[Ref. 37, p. 327, (eq. 45) ]
.
f u
Y • ~ Y •1 1
^i
2. Procedure
The Turoff procedure is essentially the same as
the basic approach until the point at which scenarios are
generated. As in the basic approach it is necessary to:
specify the event set, obtain initial probability estimates,
and obtain "conditional probability" estimates. These are
used to calculate the cross-impact factors as discussed
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previously. If there was no change in estimate from the
initial probability then C^. = 0. With this information
it is possible to calculate the remaining measures described
in the preceding section.
Turoff criticized the Monte Carlo procedure as not
producing a "consistent set of estimates" because the
assumptions underlying it imply estimator inconsistency
[Ref. 36, p. 309]. Rather than employing a random process,
Turoff generates an event sequence scenario using the
assumption that the events are time-independent in their
occurrence
.
The first step under this assumption is to select
the event whose initial probability is closest to 1 or .
If P(i) is close to zero he assumes the event did not occur,
if it is close to one it is assumed to have occurred.
Based on this decision the probabilities for the remaining
events are recalculated using the appropriate C. .. This
process is repeated using the events'' new probabilities
until all events have been decided [Ref. 36, p. 331]. This
produces a "unique" scenario. Other possible scenarios
are produced by changing the initial probability estimates
and repeating the above procedure. This is in effect,
sensitivity analysis as done in the other two approaches.
3 . Analyses Performed
In presenting his approach, Turoff demonstrates only
a sensitivity analysis. As in the basic approach, this is
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accomplished by adjusting one or more of the initial proba-
bilities and holding the remaining probabilities and the
cross-impact factors constant. In addition to reflecting a
conscious policy decision, this is the method whereby the
estimator determines if the behavior of the model built from
his responses is in accordance with his expectations. If
he is not satisfied, it is at this point that he goes back
and changes his initial and/or conditional estimates [Ref.
36, p. 331]
.
Although other types of analysis were not demon-
strated it seems most could be accomplished using this
approach. Event dominance and sensitivity could be derived
from Turoff 's cross-impact matrix using a procedure similar
to Enzer's. Since Turoff 's cross-impacts are presented as
23
a type of correlation coefficient (± °° in range) , an
indication of event desirability might be obtained through
simple summing of the positive or negative effects. Desira-
bility analysis would depend primarily on how the events
were formulated.
Turoff 's matrix also includes a measure (Gamma)
of the effects of events not specified in the event set
(and higher order interactions) . This can be interpreted
as an uncertainty measure. Estimator uncertainty could also
23
The use of correlation coefficients offers an alternate
method of interpreting respondent's meanings when they
answer the cross-impact questions. Its implications and
possible uses will be explored in Chapter Five.

be obtained by computing the range of opinion given by
a group of estimators.
4. Critique
Two major conceptual problems exist in Turoff's
technique. The first of these arises from the assumption
that estimators can be expected to provide consistent
responses. Mitchell and Tydeman reject this assumption
stating:
[Turoff] argued that there is no need
for usual traditional probability rel-
ationships to hold and included a small
example to support this assertion. In
this example, he considered two time
specific events and by undertaking
usual conditional probability analysis
concluded that P(a|b) and P(b|A) were
not standard conditional probabilities.
This is not surprising given the defin-
tions which Turoff used; in fact, the
finding is consistent with a time-
dependent interpretation of conditional
probability. The result does not support
his claim that traditional probability
relationships are irrelevant to cross-
impact studies, and that violation of
the usual probability relationships
can be justified. The fact that
people answer as though an ordering
among events was implied seems to be a
reason for explicitly recognizing this
fact in the definition of the probability
statement rather than ignoring it. [Ref. 29,
p. 135].
It is difficult to conceptualize a situation in
which an individual is able to operationalize all the
relevant components of a complex problem, and quantify
their interrelationships to produce a consistent set of
probability statements defining his paradigm on demand.
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Furthermore, assuming consistency removes the formal struc-
ture provided the methodology by classical probability
theory. Lacking an empirical base in the inexact sciences,
it seems difficult to select an appropriate manipulation
technique without some such formal theoretical basis.
The second conceptual problem arises in the scenario
generation process. By assuming time-independence Turoff
produced one scenario, or event outcome sequence, but there
seems to be little justification for assuming that it is
unique. The assumption that the most probable event in a
situation would occur first, or indeed occur at all, is
debatable. This would be especially true in a situation
characterized by surprise. This indicates that the
procedure was established arbitrarily and that several
others could have been devised which would have functioned
equally well (e.g., assuming the least probable event
occurs and the most likely does not) . Without some method
of identifying and ranking all possible outcomes, production
of a single scenario seems pointless.
A final criticism of this technique involves its
procedure. Because respondnets had to reiterate their
estimates until satisfied with the resulting coutput, an
interactive computer system was required. To replicate
this reiteration process for several respondents manually
would require an excessive number of calculations be per-
formed, and much time be expended in querying respondents.
81

The approach to be discussed in the next section seems to
overcome these problems.
E. CROSS-EVENT ANALYSIS (MITCHELL AND TYDEMAN)
This approach was developed by Mitchell and Tydeman and
presented in 1978 as a variation to Duperrin and Godet's
SMIC-74, which is discussed in the following section. As
has been shown, Mitchell and Tydeman felt it was inappro-
priate to ignore time dependence when obtaining estimates.
They felt that respondents normally interpret the questions
posed for eliciting the conditional probabilities in a time-
dependent manner. Mitchell and Tydeman attempted to use
these time -dependent estimates to derive classical condi-
tional probabilities [Ref . 39]
.
Mitchell and Tydeman also recognized that the elicited
information could be inconsistent in terms of classical
probability relationships. To minimize this problem they
used average group responses which reduced the instances
of pairwise inconsistency. In order to correct inconsis-
tencies which did manifest themselves, they developed two
fitting procedures, least squares and minimum standard devia-
tions. These procedures will be reviewed below, the authors
also suggested that Enzer's boundary rule could be used to
resolve inconsistencies [Ref. 23, p. 18].
1. Assumptions
The major difference between this and the other
approaches is that it uses causal time-dependent subjective
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probability estimates to identify first order interrela-
tionships among selected events, defining them as classi-
cal probability relations. This approach uses a specific
time horizon, rather than treating time as a random variable.
Subjective estimates were obtained which completely
identified the eight possible ordered outcomes permitted
by any event pair. These outcomes can be identified explicitly
for any event pair (i,j), and each has an associated unique









Since these outcomes are exhaustive and mutually
exclusive, certain conditions must apply [Ref. 39, p. 138
p^ + p^+p^+p^+p^+p^+p^+pg = 1 eq. 1
^1^^2 + P +P-, = P(i) eq- 2
^1 +^3 ^^5^^6 = P(j) eq. 3

The authors feel that respondents can be expected
to supply four time-dependent conditional probabilities
[Ref . 39, p. 139] .'^^
^^^l^first^ = ^1 = ^5 ^ ^^5^^e^ ^^- 4
^^^l^first^ = ^2 = ^1 T (Pi+P2^ ^^- 5
^(^13'first) = S = ^ T (Py+Ps) ^^- ^
^^^l^first^ =^4 = ^3^ (P3^P4) ^^- ^
A fifth time-dependent relationship was also
presented for estimation [Ref. 29, p. 139].
P(if^^3^|i and j occur) = ^^ = P^ - (P1+P5) eq. 8
Solving these eight relationships as simultaneous
equations, the developers demonstrate that the probabilities
for an event pair's ordered outcomes can be calculated from
the information provided by the respondents ' estimates
[Ref. 29, p. 140]
.
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If these last two equations are too difficult to
estimate, the developers derive a method whereby they















a = (I-C3) -H -
= [ (1 - C5) - C^] + C5 , and
Y =
Cc^c.^) + c^ - (030^)
Using these relationships Mitchell and Tydeman
calculate the classical conditional probabilities for
each event pair [Ref. 29, p. 140].
P(i|j.) = (P^ +P3)/(P-L +P2 +P5 +Py)
P(j!i) = (P^ +P3)/(P^ +P3 +P3 +Pg)
As mentioned earlier, the developers derived a
method to calculate non-occurrence if it could not be
estimated. To calculate the conditional probabilities with-
out estimating non-occurrence Mitchell and Tydeman adopt the
following procedure. To obtain conditional probabilities
one of the relationships needed is:

P(i and j) = P^ + Pc
or
P(i and j) = P(i and j first) + P(j and i first)
= P(i|Jfi^3t^
^(^first^ ^^^^l^first) ^^^first^
This can be obtained by estimating: P(i^. ) and P(i^. )
^ first -'first
or this can be approximated by:
P(i^) = PCifli j) P(i) and similarly for PCj^)
substuting:
P(i and j) = C5C2P(i) + {1 - C^)C^-p ij)
which is:
P(i and j) = P^ + p^ + E
where the error E is small for independent events, and more
significant for highly correlated events (10-20%) [Ref. 29,
p. 141].
(P P -P P )
E = (P,/P,+P^) [(P,P--P^PJ/(P,+P.)] + (P,/P,+P.)l/^1^^2^ L^^1^7"^2^5^/^^l"^5^-' " ^"5/"5^"6^ (P^+P^)
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Inconsistency is manifested when a negative value
is calculated for any of the probabilities P, through Pq.
L 8
Standard fitting procedures may be used to resolve inconsis-
tencies by hypothesizing that there exists a "true" or con-
sistent value (*) for each respondent's estimate. This
value is determined to be one which is "as close as possible"
to the respondent's estimates and makes all P, , ..., P^ > 0.
1 o —
The developers present two procedures which utilize this
hypothesis: least squares, and minimum standard deviations
[Ref . 29, p. 142]
.
The least squares procedure produces a minimization
program "with a quadratic objective function and non-linear
constraints" [Ref. 29, p. 142] . This program would not be
easy to solve by hand. Minimizing the absolute standard
deviations produces a moderately sized linear program with
linear constraints [Ref. 29, p. 143-4]. In addition this
program could be expanded to provide for overall consistency
by including scenario probabilities and terms for higher
order interactions [Ref. 29, p. 145]. If this correction
procedure proves too lengthy, the authors suggest Enzer's
boundary rule could be used to resolve pairwise inconsis-
tencies .
2. Procedure
To obtain the events for analysis the authors used
a procedure they termed "event assessment". For each
candidate event, the respondents provide not only the
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likelihood that the event occurs within a specified time
horizon, but an estimate of its significance given that
it occurs. An event impact score is then calculated as a
weighted function of the product of probability and signifi-
cance. In this way an analysis event set can be selected
from the events having the highest impact scores, probabili-
ties, or significance ratings [Ref. 23, p. 8].
The next step is to determine the events ' time-
dependent conditional probabilities by eliciting responses
for questions structured to provide values for equations
four through eight. These responses are aggregated and used
to compute the ordered outcome probabilities P, through ?„,
which are used to compute the classical conditional proba-
bilities. If any inconsistencies appear in this phase
(any P, through P^ < 0) , they are eliminated using the
boundary rule or fitting technique.
The next step is to generate scenarios, or event
sequence outcomes. For this procedure Mitchell and Tydeman
used a variation of the Duperrin and Godet technique. This
technique assumes that for an n nevent system there are
r = 2^ states (scenarios) . Each state "E, " has a unique
probability tt, [Ref. 48, p. 305J .
An event's theoretical probability .P* (_i) is defined
as its frequency of occurrence in all the possible states
[Ref. 49, p. 64] .
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1 if event i forms part of E,
otherwise
A similar definition can be applied to the theoretical
conditional probabilities P*(i|j) [Ref. 49, p. 64].
where
P*(i|j) = I t(ijk)^,/P*(j) for all i,j
k=l ^
t(ijk) =
1 when events i and j form part of Ej
otherwise
and








Recognizing standard probability constraints [Ref. 49,
p. 65] :
<_ P* (i) <_ 1
P*(i|j) = P*(j|i)P*(i) = P*(ij)










P*(ilj)P*(j) = I s(ijk)u, = P*(i) - P*(ij)
k=l ^
Therefore, given a consistent probability set, any set of
TT, values which satisfy:
and
r
P*(i) = I 9. TT for i = 1,2, ...,n
k=l ^^ ^
r




rI TT = 1 TT, > for all k
k=l ^ ^
~
are possible solutions to the scenario probabilities
[Ref . 49, p. 65]
.
Instead of the Duperrin and Godet quadratic objec-
tive function, Mitchell and Tydeman solve a linear equation
in terms of consistent probabilities to obtain a unique
solution. This program is [Ref. 49, p. 65-6]:
^ 2 ^ — —




subject to: I -P* ii) - I J P*(ij) ^ 1
i=l i-1 j=i+l
P* (ij) >_ all j > i
P*(i) <_ 1 all i
P*(i) > P*(ij)
all j > i
P*(j) ^ P*(ij)
3 . Analyses Performed
The cross-event approach uses a different method to
determine event dominance and sensitivity. An event's
dominance may be estimated by summing, for all other events.
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the absolute deviation of the conditional probability,
given that the event occurred first, minus the event's
original probability. This value can be standardized,
or an "elasticity" measure adopted to reflect event likeli-
hood. An event's sensitivity can be computed in a similar
fashion [Ref. 23, p. 12].
Although it was not demonstrated, causal relation-
ships could be traced as in the other approaches by filling
in the cross-event matrix. This would be useful in an
analysis Mitchell and Tydeman term "system impact analysis"
which evaluates the possible event sequence scenarios'
worth.
System impact analysis used additional subjective
ratings concerning an event sequence scenario ' s expected
impact (magnitude and direction) on specified system com-
ponents and the "expected consequences for system outcomes
(perfo2rmance measures)" (i.e., desirability) [Ref. 23,
p. 14]. In this manner a different set of possible response
actions may be identified for each scenario.
The final analysis they suggest is "strategy
evaluation". This procedure relates a set of feasible
potential strategies (response actions as determined using
system impact analysis) to each event sequence scenario
(the most probable ones) , and uses a set of objective
criteria (obtained from the decision-makers) to evaluate the




A major advantage in this approach is that it
eliminates the difficulty in interpreting estimator responses
Estimators are asked for time-dependent relationships which
are then used to calculate classical conditional probabili-
ties. Furthermore, if non-occurrence is too difficult for
respondents to conceptualize, it can be calculated,
introducing a small error.
The capability to compute the conditional proba-
bilities results in the further advantage of providing a
logical background for the analysis. Classical probability
relationships, it is suggested, can be used to insure con-
sistency and resolve inconsistencies without requiring
respondents to re-estimate. In addition, the procedure
develops a method for calculating and ranking event
sequence outcome probabilities.
With the scenario ranking, introducing subjective
estimates concerning system impact and objective measures
for comparison extends the types of decision-aiding analysis
which can be performed. With the Mitchell and Tydeman method
it is apparently possible to address questions relating to
the event sequence scenarios' desirability and strategy
effectiveness. However, in system impact analysis:
Problems still face the analyst, for
example, eliciting an exhaustive objective
set, ensuring mutual independence of
objectives, devising procedures for
measuring outcomes, determining consis-
tent weightings for the objectives
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and specifying procedures for aggre-
gation. [Ref. 23, p. 15].
These problems seem even more complex for decisions involving
national objectives and foreign policy options.
A final difficulty lies not in the conceptual
realm, but in the method's implementation. Generating the
scenario probabilities with the linear equation for a large
event set would be very difficult without access to a
computer. In order to replicate this process manually it
appears necessary to severely limit the event set to be
analyzed.
F. OTHER APPROACHES
Besides the approaches to cross-impact analysis dis-
cussed so far, several additional techniques have been pro-
posed. These techniques were concerned primarily with
assessing the relative rankings among the event sequence
scenarios. They also introduced alternative methods to
insure estimate consistency, and to resolve inconsistencies.
These techniques took significantly different approaches
towards resolving these problems than the techniques just
reviewed. However, each approach requires a computer pack-
age. Thus they were evaluated as being inappropriate for
demonstration and analysis in the present project. It was
felt to be impractical to replicate their procedures for
confirming consistency, establishing probability bounds
and revising estimates using manual methods. However, these
approaches have merit in presenting promising alternatives
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to cross-impact analysis and will be discussed briefly.
This discussion is offered in the interest of complete-
ness, and to justify the conclusion to omit them from
evaluation.
1. SMIC-74 (Duperrin and Godet)
Duperrin and Godet felt that cross-impact analysis
could be used to construct and rank event sequence scenarios
In recognition of the fact that the estimators could be
inconsistent in stating probabilities, they attempted to
derive "theoretical" scenario probabilities which were
implied by the estimator responses. Using those implied
probabilities they attempted to revise the estimated
responses to fit the theoretical scenario probabilities
and produce a consistent set of estimate. The following
diagram summarizes their procedure [Ref. 48, p. 306].
Figure 2

















In order to accomplish this process Duperrin and
Godet developed a minimization program to minimize the
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difference between the estimated factors P Ci
| j ) resulting
from the experts' responses and the theoretical factors,
P*(i|j) and P* (i)
,
expressed in terms of even sequence scenario
probabilities, TTj^ ,[Ref. 48, p. 306]. The rationale behind
this approach was covered in the Mitchell and Tydeman re-
view. The Duperrin and Godet procedure utilized a minimi-
zation program of quadratic form with linear constraints






| j ) p ( j ) _ y t(ijk)7T ]
ij k=l ^
+ j;[P(i|j)P(j) - I s(ijk)Tr,]^
ij k=l ^
subject to ) T = 1, TT, > 0, for all k
k=l ^ ^
~
Obviously, solving this program would involve utilizing
a large computer package.
Furthermore, according to Mitchell and Tydeman the
ranking produced is not unique "in that the quadratic
programme has other possible solutions", and the "number of
probability sets which satisfy the quadratic is potentially
very large" [Ref. 49, p. 64]. These conclusions led Mitchell
and Tydeman to propose their approach discussed previously.
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2. Sequential Approach (Sarin)
Sarin's approach is concerned primarily with event
sequence scenario generation. Sarin derived a larget set
of classical probability constraints which information
elicited on initial and conditional probabilities must
satisfy in order to be consistent (e.g., for a set of six
events there are sixty-four conditions the initial proba-
bilities alone must satisfy to be consistent.) [Ref. 38,
p. 54-5] . He then develops a set of linear equations with
which to compute the 2 possible event sequence outcome
probabilities and satisfy the constraints [Ref. 38, p. 59-60].
Sarin proposes that an interactive computer program
be used in conducting the analysis. The program checks the
estimator inputs for consistency, computes and supplies
bounds for further estimates, and uses the consistent inputs
to solve the linear equations producing the scenario proba-
bilities [Ref. 38, p. 58]. This approach solves the consis-
tency problem through providing respondents with immediate
feedback.
In this approach, it is possible to consider higher-
order interactions with the computer's aid. Because these
interactions are often so tightly bound it becomes unnecessary
to estimate them [Ref. 38, p. 59]. Sarin also concludes that
each discrete event influences only two scenarios, or event
outcome sequences, and it is therefore possible to conduct
sensitivity analysis through considering, and changing
initial values for, only the events which influence the top
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ranked scenarios. In this manner it is possible to estab-
lish bounds on P(i) under which the scenario ranking does
not change [Ref. 38, p. 60]. Similar bounds can be computed
for the conditional probabilities, each of which influence
only four scenarios.
Once again, the need for an interactive computer
program makes demonstrating this approach infeasible in the
current study. Furthermore, no mention is made of conducting
the other types of analysis (event dominance, sensitivity,
and tracing causal effects) which would be necessary in a
problem considering short term effects. Although such
analyses could undoubtedly be accomplished, it would require
making major modifications to the program.
3. KISM (Kane)
In 1972, Kane advanced a cross-impact procedure
which dealt with developing trends rather than discrete
events. His trend variables behaved in a logistic fashion
(as Gordon proposed) . In this formulation the net effects
of the cross-impact coefficients went to zero as the trends
reached their maximum or minimum values [Ref. 47, p. 132].
If these values are restricted to a range between one and
zero, the impact of one trend on another is given by
[Ref. 47, p. 133]
:
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sum of negative impacts on x.
1 + At
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= the cross-impact value




The relationship was modelled on a computer using the
differential [Ref. 49, p. 133].
dx. n
-rrr = - y a..x.x. Inx.dt >, 11 1 1 11=1 ^ ^
These developments can be modelled for any time increment
and analyzed by varying the initial assumptions regarding the
probabilities of the trends and the cross-impacts. Initial
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trend and cross-impact values were obtained as in the
25
standard approaches [Ref. 47, p. 131].
25This approach's intuitive appeal is apparent from the
computer output generated, which shows the interactions as
they develop over time. A sample output for a transportation
study is presented below along with the cross-impact matrix
from which it was derived. The values in the matrix are a
series of -t- ' s and -'s which were converted directly to integer
values. Another interesting point is that a trend can impact
itself in this approach. Initial probabilities for the
trends as established by the developer were [Ref. 47, p. 137]:
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Lipinski and Tydeman have attempted recently to
extend KISM to include a consideration of discrete events,
non-constant trends, and their interactions [Ref. 50]. As
with the other approaches discussed in this section this
method suffers from the requirement that a large computer
package be available for demonstration.
G. MAJOR APPROACH EVALUATION
Four primary approaches to cross-impact analysis have
been identified and explained.
The Basic Method — Attempted to elicit quantitative
values for interactions among events and revised the
initial probability estimates through a quadratic
manipulation. The cross-impact concept used was
incompletely defined, and subject to several inter-
pretations .
Enzer's Modification — Obtained estimates in terms of
likelihood ratios, included non-occurrence, addressed
pairwise consistency, and revised the conditional
probability estimates.
The Turoff Approach — Assumed estimator consistency,
used inputs to derive correlation coefficients,
and attempted to identify a unique scenario.
Cross-Event Analysis — Derived conditional probability
relationships from causal time-dependent estimates
and used a linear program to identify and rank
scenarios
.
Although the major problems associated with each of these
approaches were identified in the discussion, selecting an
approach for application cannot be made unless the approaches
are systematically compared. The evaluation criteria developed




1. Is the event scope adequate?
2. Can events be rated on importance/desirability?
3. What types of analysis are permitted?
4. Is the approach computer adaptable?
5. Are required estimates clearly formulated?
6. Are estimates consistent, or can consistency
be obtained?
7. What manipulation algorithm is used?
8. Is the procedure logical/justifiable?
9. How is consistency obtained?
10. How are scenarios generated, can they be ranked?
11. How many estimates are required?
12. What types of computations must be performed?
13. How many terms are involved?
14
.
How many calculations are required?
1. Evaluation
The following table summarizes the findings discussed
in the preceding sections in relation to these evaluation
criteria. The four primary cross-impact approaches identi-
fied form the column headings. Each entry in the table repre-
sents a brief summary of how an approach was evaluated as to
meeting the numbered criteria which form the row headings.
Specific conclusions based on this evaluation will be pre-
sented in the selection section of this chapter which follows
Table One.
A few of the criteria were omitted from the table
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general criteria will be commented on below. In considering
the last three criteria which addressed the required compu-
tations' form and number (criteria 12, 13, and 14), two
assumptions were made: (1) The types of computations and
number of terms (criteria 12 and 13) include all possible
computations which could be necessary (including computing
cross-impacts and resolving inconsistencies) in demonstrating
the approach, except for those involved in aggregating esti-
mates to produce an average value. These computations
would not be approach dependent. (2) The number of computa-
tions (criterion 14) does not include computations required
in either aggregation nor resolving inconsistencies, as the
latter depends on the knowledge of the respondents.
The general criteria were found to be:
a. Event Scope (1)
Event formulation in all the methods can cover
any subject or combination of subjects. The only restric-
tions concern the linkages between events, and the way in
which events are stated. These restrictions apply equally
to all approaches
.
b. Event Rating (2)
Although each approach did not rate events for
selection for analysis, the procedures proposed by Enzer and
by Mitchell and Tydeman are flexible enough to be applied in
any cross-impact analysis. Thus once a technique is selected
it is necessary only to select a method to evalute the events.
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and explain the criteria for subjective estimates to the
respondents
.
c. Computer Adaptability (4)
Each method reviewed acknowledged that a computer
would be necessary in order to deal with a large event set.
Turoff s approach required that an interactive computer be
available to query respondents, and present them with the
results produced by their estimates. Enzer proposed that a
computer be used to provide probability bounds based on
estimator responses for each event pair. It appears that
all necessary calculations could be easily programmed, and
that a software package could be developed to elicit responses
for any type of event. Therefore, it is felt that all the
approaches may be considered computer adaptable.
The evaluation of each approach in relation to
the remaining criteria is presented in Table One. This




As the discussion below indicates, of the four major
cross-impact approaches evaluated, the Turoff method seems
to be the least promising for demonstration in this study.
The basic (Gordon) method was developmental and substantially
extended by Enzer. Enzer ' s approach, however, involved
difficulties in relating respondents' estimtes (which could
be interpreted as providing causal time-dependent probabilities)
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with classical probability theory. This shortcoming would
make it difficult to explain the technique to respondents.
In contrast, the Mitchell and Tydeman approach develops
procedures to calculate classical conditional probabilities
from the apparently time-dependent estimates, and provides
a scenario ranking algorithm. For these reasons it was
selected for demonstration in this study. The following
discussion will present the rationale behind these conclusions,
and indicate anticipated problems in implementing the selected
approach.
Due to its assumption that estimators are consis-
tent, the Turoff approach requires that they be allowed to
revise their estimates until satisfied with the model pro-
duced. This requirement, as mentioned previously, would be
hard to meet in a manual demonstration. The assumption of
consistency cannot be validated because the cross-impacts
are calculated in terms of correlation coefficients (ranging,
however, from +°° to -=°) , which do not reveal inherent incon-
sistencies as do probabilities when they exceed unity or
become negative.
The Turoff approach is further limited by its time-
independence assumption for scenario generation. This pro-
duces only one scenario for each set of estimates, and there
is no reasonable basis for assuming that it is either a
unique or most probable scenario. Finally, the time-
independence assumption would be unworkable in an analysis
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attempting to examine the effects produced by discrete
response options which might be implemented in reacting to
a developing crisis situation. The rationale and structure
of this type of analysis will be developed more fully in the
extension section of this chapter which follows.
The basic cross-impact approach, developed by Gordon
and Hayward, while important in introducing the technique's
basic concepts and potential applications was primarily a
developmental approach. As such it suffered from several
conceptual shortcomings which were eliminated in later
approaches. These shortcomings were reviewed extensively
elsewhere in this study, and stem from the use of the quadratic
manipulation technique, ignoring non-occurrence, and incom-
plete explanation of the cross-impact factors. Because this
approach was greatly modified by Enzer it was decided to
eliminate it from further consideration for selection.
Enzer 's modified approach dealt with many of the
problems inherent in the basic method. He developed an
uncertainty measure, addressed non-occurrence and consistency,
and eliminated the quadratic manipulation. However, in
developing these improvements he failed to solve the problem
of how to interpret estimator responses. Enzer recognized
that causal relationships were being elicited, but used
classical probability relationships to compute non-occurrence
and resolve inconsistencies. The cross-impacts were defined
as likelihood ratios denoting an event's change in probability
given the occurrence of another event. This change was
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denoted by the conditional probability relationship P(i|j),
however, the actual relationship seems to involve time-
dependence. Therefore, this approach seems to be limited by
the incomplete incorporation of two types of probabilistic
relationships. In order to demonstrate a technique it will
be necessary to explain its rationale to the selected study
group. This requirement makes the modified approach unsuit-
able for demonstration because of the difficulty in explain-
ing these fine distinctions and their implications to respon-
dents unaccustomed to providing this type of information.
Cross-event analysis assumes that respondents normally
think in terms of time-dependent probabilities, and uses
these estimates to calculate the conditional probabilities
from the relationships implied by the estimator's responses.
Because this approach seeks to explicitly identify quanti-
tative values for all possible outcomes of each event pair,
a greater number of subjective estimates is required. How-
ever, the questions used to obtain these estimates are formu-
lated in a manner which appears to be more closely akin to
suspected individual thought processes (P(ilj^. ^) )
•
Since these estimates are used to compute the proba-
bilities of the eight possible ordered outcomes and then to
calculate the classical conditional probabilities, more com-
putational steps are involved in using this procedure. These
formulae are relatively basic and can be easily programmed
on a hand-held calculator. This extra burden is, therefore,
not considered excessive in light of the advantages gained.
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Using the time-dependent causal estimates, pairwise
probabilistic consistency is automatically checked when com-
puting the probabilities of the ordered outcomes. By
specifying values for these outcomes it is possible to derive
a logical transition to the classical conditional proba-
bilities. This avoids the problem of applying Bayesian proba-
bility relationships to causal estimates, and eliminates the
need to adopt less supportable assumptions - such as estimator
consistency. At the same time, because it is possible to
use the classical probability relationships, the Mitchell-
Tydeman method is given a firm methodological footing.
Finally, Mitchell and Tydeman ' s cross-event approach
provides an algorithm for computing scenario probabilities.
This capability is necessary if decision-makers are to be
provided a means of assessing possible courses of action in
responding to ongoing developments. Scenario probabilities
cannot be obtained under the Turoff method's assiimption of
time-independence, and could only be derived from the Enzer
method by conducting an excessive number of Monte Carlo runs
(exceeding the number of possible event sequences)
.
For these reasons, the Mitchell and Tydeman cross-
event analysis method was selected for demonstration and
evaluation in this study. Because the purpose of the demon-
stration is to evaluate cross-impact analysis ' potential as
a decision aid in crisis situations, several modifications
to the approach were considered necessary. These modifica-
tions, presented below, were intended to extend the method
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in order to evaluate policy options for response in a
developing situation.
H. EXTENSION
This section will discuss several methodological
alterations through which cross-event analysis can be
extended as a decision-aid for use in crisis situations.
Four aspects of the methodology will be dealt with. These
are: (1) the time span of analysis, (2) identifying policy
options for inclusion in the event set, (3) the method of
analysis, and (4) scenario generation.
1. Time Span
Crisis situations normally occur without adequate
warning and allow a short time for response. As Enzer and
Alter pointed out, the time span usually considered in a
cross-impact analysis is determined by the amount of time
required for an event's impact to be felt by another event
[Ref. 40, p. 233], Since the technique being explored here
is intended to evaluate response options, it is felt that
this time span should be kept relatively short.
In a crisis situation, it seems reasonable to assume
that most response options would be designed to have an
immediate effect in altering the situation in some desired
direction. For this reason, it appears desirable to limit
the analysis to a consideration of the two weeks or so follow-
ing the identification of a crisis. As there is almost no
time lag involved, the event prediction need only involve
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occurrence and non-occurrence, rather than exact dates. This
is a level one analysis described in Johnson [Ref. 40],
which predicts only those events which occur by a specific
date. In providing initial estimates, respondents will not
be asked for occurrence dates, in providing causal time-
dependent estimates any event may be considered to occur
before any other.
In the analysis, the sequence in which events occur
will be revealed through scenario generation. As will be
shown below, this will aid in evaluating likely scenarios for
plausability
. This assumption would not be valid if the
effects of policy options were to be examined in their full
context. As has been noted, careful evaluation would require
an assessment of a response option's long-term effect, not
only on the crisis situation. In a "real world" application
the short-term and long-term analyses could be conducted
simultaneously to identify a possible response to control the
crisis and to evaluate its potential future effects. Such
an approach was not adopted here because of this study's
developmental and exploratory character.
2 . Identifying Policy Options
The normal procedure in cross-impact analysis has
been to evaluate the effects produced by implementing policy
options through arbitrarily increasing or decreasing selected
events' initial probabilities. This seems to be contrary to
a basic goal of the approach, which is to identify an event's
unanticipated effects. Furthermore, Gordon and Hayward
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hypothesized that an event normally has a predecessor or
precedes another event [Ref. 26]. it was the purpose of the
technique to systematically assess these interactions. In
the normal sensitivity analysis, a policy option is excluded
from the matrix, and assumed to have only the effect intended.
In the Mitchell and Tydeman approach, subjective
assessments are made of the impact that specific strategies
have on the various scenarios. This requires a prior "Sys-
tem Impact Analysis" to assess how the occurrence of a
scenario impacts identifiable system attributes, and the
development of "objective criteria" to evaluate policy
strategies. It has been pointed out that the validity of
this process would be tenuous for problems involving national
objectives. Furthermore, it increases the number and com-
plexity of the subjective estimates required.
In an effort to simplify the process of assessing the
impact of policy options on situational outcomes, this
study will attempt to identify specific policy responses
available for dealing with the hypothetical situation and
include them in the original cross-event matrix. These
response options will be identified and assessed as any other
event which might develop from the given situation under
normal circumstances. Using this approach will eliminate
the need for "System Impact Analysis". Normal sensitivity
analysis will still be conducted to determine response option
flexibility in the event that available information was mis-
leading and/or the problem components were evaluated incorrectly
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by the respondents. Including response options in the event
set also permits other extensions.
3. Method of Analysis
One possible extension involves the type of analysis
performed by evaluating the causal relationships contained
in the cross-event matrix. If the events representing policy
options are separated from the events representing situation
developments a four-quadrant matrix is formed as represented
below.
FIGURE THREE
FOUR-QUADRANT CROSS -EVENT MATRIX
the effect on
this event is




















(note: the diagonal cells can still contain the initial
probabilities)
Because the subjective estimates used to obtain the
conditional probabilities are in a causal time-dependent
form, the following interpretations might be given to each
of the four quadrants.
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I. (d|d) — Represents the situation as it might
develop assuming no corrective action is taken.
This depicts the results of allowing a given
crisis to continue.
II. (0|d) — Represents how the occurrence of given
developments effect the probabilities of various
response options. The occurrence of certain
developments may make a response option more
attractive. (it is felt that at this point not
enough information is available to use this
interaction to predict which response option
may be selected, only whether or not the
respondents consider it more attractive.)
III. (d|o) — Represents the effect on the situation
produced by the occurrence of each response
option. This would be the primary quadrant
with which to evaluate the response options.
IV. (0|0) — Indicates the interaction among
possible response options. This possibly could
be used to trace the impacts of a mixed
strategy, or to evaluate the effects of imple-
menting more than one response.
As in the traditional approaches, each of these
quadrants could be evaluated to determine event dominance,
sensitivity, and estimator uncertainty. Other forms of
analysis would remain essentially the same. These inter-
pretations can only be hypothesized at this time. It will
require experimental data to determine their applicability.
Therefore, this type of analysis will be attempted using the
results from the demonstration exercise.
4 . Scenario Generation
Since specific policy options are to be included
in the event set, it is questionable as to whether they
should be included in the event sequence scenario generation,
The occurrence or non-occurrence of a policy option is not
determined solely by the situation developments but also by
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the decision-maker's perceptions and the evaluations they
make. The policy options are explicitly included in order
to facilitate more complete evaluation. Based on this
information, the decision-makers would then select the
option (s) to be implemented (i.e., decide occurrence).
It might also be argued that by including one, or
all, options in event sequence scenario generation it would
be possible to determine which option (s) should be implemented
(based on their occurrence or non-occurrence in the most
probable scenario). In other words, generating and ranking
scenarios with N options (N = 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . ,n) , and evaluating
these scenarios for desirability would indicate which
options produced the most desirable outcomes.
However, in a short term situation, the specific
event sequence scenario may not be so important. Accurate
information is limited, and the unexpected could always
happen (including events not specified in the set) . There-
fore, scenario generation intended to provide specific predic-
tions would be of questionable value unless the problem was
clearly understood by the estimators. In view of these
considerations, this demonstration will only include the
situation developments in event sequence scenario generation.
I. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter described four major approaches to conducting
cross-impact analysis, including their basic assumptions,
computational procedures, and types of analysis performed.
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Based on this discussion, and using consistent evaluation
criteria, the approaches were compared and the Mitchell-
Tydeman cross-event analysis was selected for us in this
study.
Cross-event analysis was selected because, although it
required obtaining more numerous subjective estimates, its
methodology and underlying assumptions seemed more systematic
and thorough as well as intuitively pleasing. In addition,
the calculations required in the procedure appeared to be
simple enough to perform without using a computer. The
Mitchell and Tydeman approach was extended for application
in a crisis situation. This extension involved: limiting the
time span considered in the analysis, including policy options
as discrete events for analysis in the matrix rather than
through sensitivity analysis alone, and restricting scenario
generation to include only situational developments while
excluding policy options.
As indicated in the discussion of the major approaches,
several problems may still be encountered in operationalizing
this approach. Some of these problems are inherent in
conceptualizing the cross-impact technique itself and can-
not, therefore, be resolved until data have been collected
and analyzed. Such problems include: how estimators can
best quantify the interrelationships being sought (proba-
bilistically or as correlations) , how to interpret estimator
responses (as classical probabilities, causal time-dependent
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probabilities, or as correlation coefficients), and how
inconsistencies should be treated (ignored, boundary rules,
or fitting methods)
.
The selected technique assumes respon-
dents can think in probabilistic terms, indeed, in terms of
causal time-dependent probabilities, and that inconsistencies
are best resolved using fitting procedures.
Other potential problems arise from dealing with subjec-
tive estimates, and from the methodology used in the selected
approach. These include how best to aggregate estimates,
and how to resolve inconsistencies. Both of these depend on
the form in which the estimates are elicited and the actual
values obtained. Therefore, these problems will be examined
in the context of the selected technique's operationalization.
The next chapter will discuss the actual implementation
process and present the demonstration results. The imple-
mentation process will describe how the demonstration was
structured, and the problems encountered in using the Mitchell
and Tydeman approach. The demonstration results will be used
to evalute the accuracy of the approach's assumptions, and





Employing cross-impact analysis in an experimental appli-
cation requires developing and following a logical implemen-
tation process. Due to the approach's information require-
ments and the type of problem proposed, four preliminary
steps are necessary for implementation. The first task is
to identify a study group to act as expert respondents. Next,
a problem environment for analysis has to be constructed.
Then, this problem environment, and the approach's purpose,
methodology, and information requirements have to be explained
to the study group. Finally, a procedure to elicit the group's
subjective estimtes has to be devised.
Once the preliminary background has been laid, actual
implementation requires collecting and structuring the res-
spondents ' estimates into the format required by the cross-
event approach, and conducting the analysis. This process
includes : identifying candidate events and selecting from
these the analysis event set, and aggregating individual esti-
mates into group response values to provide the data for
replicating the analysis performed by Mitchell and Tydeman
[Ref . 29] .^^
2 ft
The purpose behind using group values is two-fold.
First, it should reduce instances of pairwise inconsistency
[Ref. 29]. Secondly, as proposed by Enzer, the respondents'
opinion spread could serve as an estimator uncertainty
indicator [Ref. 27, p. 55].
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To replicate the cross-event analysis, as extended in
the previous chapter, it is necessary to perforin two calcu-
lation steps. The first step is to compute the event pair
ordered outcome probabilities (P, through ?„) . These values
are then used in the second step which calculates the con-
ditional probabilities implied by the respondents' estimates.
The conditional probabilities can then be arranged into a
cross-event matrix and scenario generation undertaken. These
tools are then used to perform the problem analysis.
This chapter describes the implementation design developed
for this study. It discusses how the actual operationaliza-
tion evolved by reviewing the successes and failures encoun-
tered in following the designed implementation. Finally, the
data collected are presented and analyzed.
B. IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN
The entire operationalization process was designed to
follow the demonstration described by Mitchell and Tydeman
[Ref. 29, p. 145-147]. Their "event assessment" procedure
was used to select an analysis event set [Ref. 23, p. 6-9],
the forms for obtaining subjective estimates were taken from
the examples contained in Ref. 29, and the equations used
in all calculations were from the derivations presented in
the same source.
The procedure used to demonstrate cross-event analysis in
a hypothetical situation was constructed to follow five phases




To establish the problem environment for analysis a
hypothetical problem scenario was developed. Several con-
siderations influenced this development. Because the problem
was intended to represent an emerging crisis situation, the
scenario had to threaten identifiable national interests,
suggest potential policy options which could be identified
as responses, and involve recognized actors. This last con-
sideration was adopted for two reasons. Using real actors
would provide an actual basis for the respondents ' percep-
tions rather than having to structure perceptions by speci-
fying a host of hypothetical historical, social, political,
economic, etc. data in the scenario. Also, using real
actors was expected to make estimation and analysis more
meaningful to the respondents.
To satisfy the above requirements and involve as much
current information as possible in the problem environment,
the scenario was based on developments in South Asia. A
brief justification for this decision will be presented in
the next section which describes the actual scenario pre-
sented to the respondents.
The scenario was presented in four sections to allow
as complete a development as possible. Those sections were:
(1) Background — described the primary actors, their internal
situations and external relationships. (2) Event Sequence —
listed the hypothetical moves and counter-moves taken by the
various actors. (3) Resulting Situation — set forth the
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actual problem (crisis) to be analyzed and responded to.
(4) U.S. Concerns ~ described what appeared to be the
significant U.S. interests in the area. The scenario
presentation was conducted as the second segment of the
design implementation's explanation phase.
2. Explanation
This phase described the experiment's purpose and
methodology to the study group. This explanation was in-
tended to help the respondents understand their role in the
experiment. It included: The rationale behind using sub-
jective estimates, the information the respondents would
be asked to provide, the information format, how the infor-
mation would be analyzed, and answered any questions which
arose. In this manner it was hoped to fully involve the
respondents in the project and thereby produce more care-
fully considered responses, while demonstrating to the
respondents the approach's potential as a learning tool.
The explanation phase involved two segments. The
first described cross-impact theory, its assumptions,
methodology and proposed applications. Once the basic
concepts and their use was understood, the Mitchell and
Tydeman approach was described to the study group. This
presentation highlighted the functions the respondents
would be required to perform.
The second explanation segment presented and dis-
cussed the hypothetical scenario. This was presented in
four sections, as previously described, in order that the
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participants could fully understand the problem elements
involved. In an actual application this segment would be
optional, as the "experts" could be expected to be familiar
with the problem environment. Once the respondents under-
stood the technique and hypothetical problem the third
implementation phase was begun.
3. Elicit Estimates
This phase was designed to obtain the subjective
estimates used in the problem analysis. Two estimation
procedures were developed for this process. The first
used a "brainstorming" technique to elicit a candidate
event set. Immediately after the scenario discussion the
respondents were asked to suggest developments which might
occur resulting from the proposed situation. All subse-
quent estimates were obtained using an individual response
procedure.
Once the candidate event set was established the
respondents were asked to individually rate each event's
initial occurrence probability and significance. This
information was used to conduct an "event assessment" and
select a manageable event set for analysis. As discussed
previously, this procedure was adopted to reduce both the
number of estimates and computations required by concen-
trating on only the "important" events. Individual esti-
mates were then obtained for the causal time-dependent
probability relationships (C, through C^) existing in each




The fourth phase was designed to structure the
respondents' estimates into the cross-event format and
analyze the resulting output. Individual responses were
aggregated into group values and used to compute the
"cross-impacts" from the foirmulae developed by Mitchell
and Tydeman. This procedure computed the ordered event
pair outcome probabilities (P^ through P ) and the resulting
conditional probabilities for each event pair. At the same
time, pair-wise consistency could be checked and resolved
if necessary. Because group values were used, instances
of inconsistency were expected to be rare.
Given consistent estimates a cross-event matrix
would be constructed and scenarios generated. These data
would then be analyzed as described in Chpater Three. The
analyses to be performed included: For events — determining
dominance, sensitivity, signficance, and uncertainty. For
interrelationships — conducting causal tracings through the
event matrix (as discussed in the extension section of Chap-
ter Three) , evaluating response options using the matrix
and scenarios, performing scenario and sensitivity analysis.
The implementation design included presentation of the
analysis results as its final section.
5. Presentation of Results
This phase was designed to organize and present the
analysis results for evaluation. These results were pre-
sented to the study group to close the feedback loop and
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complement the learning experience. This phase also
involved the participants in evaluating the cross-impact
technique.
Respondents were asked to suggest possible reasons
for the results obtained, and to assess whether or not
the information derived from their estimates met their
expectations. They were also asked to comment on their
impressions concerning the technique's procedures and poten-
tial utility. This information, and the analysis results,
were used in evaluating cross-event analysis as a possible
crisis decision-aiding methodology. The respondents'
feedback and the actual implementation experience were used
to evaluate the procedure's ease of application, to iden-
tify possible problems and to recommend improvements. The
following section recounts how the designed implementation
actually evolved, and identifies the successes and problems
encountered in operationalizing cross-event analysis.
C. ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION
The preliminary implementation steps were relatively
easy to accomplish. The study group utilized was a Data
Analysis for Naval Intelligence class being conducted
(Spring Quarter, 1979) at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. The class provided ten respondents
(nine Naval officers and a civilian Professor) . The offi-
cers had various types of operational experience in the
U.S. Navy, and were undertaking graduate studies in the
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school's National Security Affairs Department. Thus,
their background was felt to be adequate for demonstration
purposes. All respondents had some exposure to probability
and statistics, organizational management and decision-making,
and various topics in National Security and Intelligence.
In addition, most had kept abreast of ongoing developments
in South Asia. These characteristics simplified the explana-
tion process as no really "new" material had to be covered.
The explanation phase previously outlined consisted
essentially of orally summarizing Chapter Two and the cross-
event analysis section in Chapter Three of this study. The
explanation also reviewed the procedure designed to elicit
the group's subjective opinions. In the second explanation
phase, the study group was led through the scenario developed
for this demonstration. The problem scenario presented to
the respondents will be described below, followed by des-
criptions of the remaining implementation phases.
1. Scenario Development
Developments in South Asia and around the Persian
Gulf have become a focal point for U.S. diplomatic, economic,
and military interests. This increasing interest has been
well documented by noted political scientists and historians.
These authors have detailed increasing U.S. interest in.
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and commitment to, the region resulting from numerous
27interrelated factors.
Some of the primary factors influencing U.S.
interests in the area include, increasing U.S. dependence
on imported oil and the tenuous supply links through which
2 8it is obtained. Another factor is the increased Soviet
influence in South Asia, their increasing naval presence in
2 9the Indian Ocean, and the purpose behind this presence.
A third concern is the continuing tension in the region
which seems to keep the relationships in the area in a
27For example, Nadav Safran discusses the U.S. involve-
ment growing out of the Middle East peace process [Ref . 51]
.
Richard Ullman has examined U.S. policy options in the
area in light of continuing tensions and outside pressures
[Ref. 52] . Basic considerations for U.S. policy in this
area were presented by Campbell and Lenczowski [Refs. 53
and 54] . Inter-regional relationships and super-power roles
are examined by Vali [Ref. 55] , while Wall has collected
papers addressing relevant strategic concerns [Ref. 56].
Many of the interests and concerns developed by these
authors are reflected in official U.S. Government docu-
ments such as the "Department of Defense Authorization
for Appropriations for FY 79" policy statements [Ref. 57].
28 The oil question is explored by analysts such as
Lenczowski and Anthony [Refs. 58 and 59] . Its future
implications are examined in a CIA forecast [Ref. 60]
,
which indicates that the situation is unlikely to improve.
29 ...
Increased Soviet influence and military presence is
discussed by Lenczowski [Ref. 61] , Hurewitz [Ref. 62]
Tahtinen [Ref. 63] , and McConnell [Ref. 64] . The dispute
over the intentions behind this presence has produced a
resultant U.S. policy debate over its military presence
reviewed in Daniel [Ref. 65].
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state of flux and instability . ^° The complexities of these
problems are indicated by several authors. Although a complete
development of these and associated factors is beyond the
scope of this study, that the region's importance is an area
for continued policy analysis should be self-evident.
Further, recent developments in several South Asian states have
thrust the region's problems more prominantly into public view.
Among those recent developments is the pro-Soviet coup
in Afghanistan coupled with signs of increased Soviet influence
within the new regime and subsequent internal turmoil. Another
situation causing increased concern was the overthrow of the
Shah of Iran and resulting uncertainty over the direction in
which the new government would evolve. Adding to general con-
cern for the course of the Iranian situation has been the
centrifugal forces set in motion by Kurdish and Arab national-
ists as well as politically liberal forces within the country.
In addition, the execution of Bhutto by Pakistani authorities
has increased internal dissent in that country. This dissent
is significant because it occurs during a period of tension
between Afghanistan and Pakistan concerning reputed Pakistani
support for dissident tribesmen challenging the Taraki regime
in Afghanistan.
A regional perspective on area tensions is presented by
Amire [Ref. 66], and iMisra [Ref. 67]. Burrell and Cottrell .
[Ref. 68] explore specific problems faced by the states of
South Asia.
^"'"These developments are being continuously reported in
magazine and newspaper articles. Articles describing these
specific developments include: On the Soviet involvement and
turmoil in Afghanistan; Sherwell, Chris, "Fighting May Boost
Soviet Presence in Afghanistan," The Christian Science Monitor ,
p. 6, Dec. 29, 1978, and Sherwell, Chris, "Soviet Union Mired
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For these reasons it was decided to develop a problem
scenario involving relations in South Asia. The study group
would be familiar with the basic situation existing in the area,
and could easily identify important (as well as plausible)
developments reflecting U.S. interests and possible response
options. The actual scenario was developed as follows.
a. Background
This section, supported with newspaper clippings,
presented the current situation existing within and among the
three regional actors being considered. Afghanistan was
described as having recently undergone a pro-Soviet coup. Its
military was identified as a prime factor in maintaining poli-
tical control. The country's administrative bodies, including
the military, were reported to be heavily influenced by Soviet
advisors. In addition, the state's internal situation was
characterized as being plagued with anti-government groups,
consisting mainly of Moslem tribesmen in the rural areas.
The situation in Pakistan was described as
involving increased internal dissent resulting from Bhutto's
execution. Problems were also reported to be developing
from the influx of Afghan refugees. In addition, the
Pakistani military was described as poorly equipped and
preoccupied with the Indian threat to Kashmir.
in Afghanistan," The Christian Science Monitor, p. 3, May 24, 19 79
On Iran's internal power struggle; Godell, Geoffrey, "Leftists
Step up Struggle for Control of Iran Revolution," The Christian
Science Monitor
,
p. 3, Feb. 16, 19 79, and Allaway, Tony, "Kurdish
Unrest Tests New Iran," The Christian Science Monitor , p. 3,
Mar. 22, 1979., On Pakistan; "Delayed Decision on Bhutto to
Affect Pakistan Deeply," The Christian Science Monitor , p. 4,
Mar. 19, 1979, and Marshall, Tyler, "Indian Subcontinent Faces




Iran's current government was described as
disorganized, composed of several rival factions, and
challenged by elements (including leftists and ethnic
minorities) desiring more control. The effectiveness and
loyalty of Iran's military was also brought into question,
due to its history of supporting the Shah and the execution
of several important leaders. This development stressed the
fact that authority in Iran could still be considered to
be in a state of flux. Finally, Iran's historic role in
controlling disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan
concerning the territory of Baluchistan was mentioned.
Using this simplified background discussion as a basis,
a hypothetical sequence of developments was proposed to
the study group.
b. Event Sequence
- Tribesmen in Baluchistan CSouth Afghanistan)
begin a national autonomy movement. This movement
receives some support from related tribes in Iran and
Pakistan.
- Clashes occur between Afghani government
forces and rebel tribesmen in Baluchistan.
- The Afghani government dispatches additional
troops to control the area. These troops are Soviet
supported, but the extent of this support is unknown.
- These forces drive the majority of the rebels
across the border into Iran and Pakistan.
- Both sides (rebels and Afghani troops) begin
cross-border raids. By this time the majority of the
Afghan army is committed.
- Afghanistan charges that Iran and Pakistan
are aiding the rebel forces. The Afghan government vows to
defeat any outside threat to its territorial integrity.
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The Soviet Union supports this delcaration and offers toincrease assistance to Afghanistan.
- Iran authorities deny the Afghani charges and
state that increased Soviet involvement would only worsen
the situation. Pakistan charges the Soviet Union with trying
to precipitate a crisis in the region, and requests U.S.
aid.
- Regular Afghani forces clash with Iranian
border troops. This clash erupts into uncontrolled shelling
along the border.
- Baluchistan rebels call on Muslim states for
support against the communists, suggesting a "holy war"
be launched.
- Iranian leftists, reportedly supplied by the
Soviets, begin a terrorist campaign to oust the Ayatollah's
government
.
- Iran announces support for rebel tribesmen
and launches a "limited" invasion to pacify the area, and
expel "expansionist" communists.
- Pakistani forces join the conflict.
- The Soviet Union sends troops to Afghanistan
which check the Iranians. Reports indicate the Soviets
have -mobilized on Iran's border, that their agents are
agitating Iranian Kurds, and that they have sent a secret
mission to Iraq.
- Soviet and Afghani forces press attack to the
original Afghan border, but show no signs of halting.
Steps are being taken to set up a "puppet" government for
Baluchistan. Indications are that Soviets and Afghanis
may attempt to include Baluchistan land in Iran and
Pakistan under control of an "autonomous" Baluchi government.
Based on these developments, the following
situation was proposed to exist in South Asia. This situa-
tion described the crisis problem to be evaluated using
cross-event analysis.
c. Resulting Situation
- Open warfare exists in the area south of
Afghanistan extending into Iran and Pakistan. This
fighting involves Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, rebel
tribesmen, and (reportedly) some Soviet forces.
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- The Soviets have mobilized along Iran's
border and are conducting secret talks with Iraq.
- Iranian Kurds and leftists (separately) are
almost in open revolt.
- India has mobilized along Pakistan's border,
to "prevent the conflict from spilling over."
- Chinese troops have mobilized in Sinkiang
in response to "Soviet aggression, and to demonstrate
support for the Baluchistan People's Movement".
To guide the respondents in proposing candidate
events the following "probable" U.S. concerns were also
presented.
d. U.S. Concerns
- The current conflict threatens navigation in
the Straits of Hormuz. In addition, the fighting is close
to the main oil producing region in Iran, threatening the
security of those fields.
- The Soviet Union may extend its influence to
the Indian Ocean if it manages to sponsor a client state of
Baluchistan. This would permit both overland access to
the Indian Ocean and possible naval basing rights.
- The current tunnoil directly threatens U.S.
civilians in the area and, to a lesser extent, U.S. economic
interests.
- The potential involvement of India and China
and possible direct Soviet intervention suggest a major
confrontation may be developing.
This scenario provided the background against
which the respondents were asked to suggest a candidate
event set, and formulate the required subjective estimates.
This process will be described in the following section




The next task undertaken in the demonstration re-
quired establishing a candidate event set. Before the
group was asked to brainstorm possible developments, several
procedural points were reviewed. The study group was
reminded that suggested events be considered as developing
from the given situation. Enzer's criteria for including
events in the set were also reviewed. These criteria
stress that candidate events be (1) important to the situa-
tion, (2) of uncertain outcome, (3) causally related, and
(4) specific. Finally, the event formulation rules proposed
by Mitchell and Tydeman were reviewed to assure the suggested
events could be clearly understood by the group. These
procedural points were discussed in Chapter Two.
a. Establishing the Event Set
Once the group understood the required event
formulation method, a brainstorming session began. As
events were suggested they were recorded and posted before
the group. This process continued until it became apparent
that the participants had exhausted all their ideas. A
brief discussion session then was allowed to clear up any
uncertainties. Twenty-nine candidate events were proposed
during this session. Ten of these represented possible U.S.
responses to the situation, the remainder represented situa-
tion developments. These events are presented in Appendix
A.

In order to select an analysis event set the
group was next asked to provide the subjective evaluations
required for Mitchell and Tydeman's "event assessment"
procedure. These inputs consisted of two estimates. The
first required the respondents to evaluate each event's
initial occurrence probability. These probabilities were
collected individually by having each respondent score every
event on the following scale. Each evaluation was to be
made without considering the influence any other event in
the set might have on the situation.
TABLE TWO
EVENT PROBABILITY DESCRIPTIONS AND RATINGS
STATEMENT RATING







The second estimate required respondents to
evaluate each event's significance should it occur. An
event's significance was defined as the influence it would
have on the overall problem situation, assuming it did
occur. These ratings were based on the following scale,,











This procedure produced ten values under each
criterion for each of the twenty-nine events. These indi-
vidual scores were aggregated and used to produce an impact
rating for each event. The twenty-nine candidate events
and their probability, significance, and impact ratings are
contained in Appendix A.
Several problems were encountered during this
estimation procedure which were unanticipated in the prob-
lem design. While eliciting candidate events two tenden-
cies were noticed which seemed to inhibit the formulation
process. In brainstorming, the respondents seemed to con-
centrate on a suggested event and propose subsequent events
which would develop should the first event occur. Often
this process would lead far afield until interrupted by
the facilitator interjecting an alternative event. On
other occasions, an event's suggestion seemed to elicit the
proposal of a response event aimed specifically at the first
event. Another problem encountered stemmed from the respon-
dent's experience level or knowledge.
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Some respondents seemed to be intimidated by
the ease with which other respondents formulated and jus-
tified suggested events. A few respondents stated they
felt unqualified to participate, and questioned the validity
of their future estimates given their lack of equal knowl-
edge concerning South Asia. These problems seem to be
inherent in the "brainstorming" process.
In future applications it is felt that using
trained or experienced facilitators could reduce the prob-
lem of respondent intimidation, and better control the brain-
storming process. In addition, research using the delphi
procedure indicates that having respondents rate themselves
on their confidence in answering questions provides a cri-
terion with which to weight individual responses to produce
improved group values [Ref . 13] . This method might be
incorporated in future cross-impact applications.
The fact that suggested events often led to
related events being suggested indicates a basic cross-
event assumption may be unfounded. The approach operates
on the theory that respondents can think in terms of dis-
crete events. Based on this assumption respondents are
asked to provide initial probability and significance esti-
mates for each event independently. However, during the
brainstorming process, respondents exhibited a tendency to
propose events in an iterative manner. This suggests that
the group may find it difficult to conceptualize relationships
in terms of discrete events, and therefore may conceive of
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of related probability and significance questions inter-
dependently, or as contingencies. This in turn indicates
that another approach to quantifying estimates may be more
appropriate. This point will be developed more exten- •
sively in the next chapter.
Other problems were encountered when the indi-
vidual estimates were aggregates to produce the impact
ratings. In their procedure, Mitchell and Tydeman use a
weighted product of each event's probability and signifi-
cance scores to produce its impact rating. This procedure
was found to produce inadequate results in this demonstra-
tion. The results obtained seemed to disguise the impact
assigned an event which received a combination of a low
and high rating on the two criteria evaluated. A simpli-
fied, hypothetical example may help to illustrate this point
Assume three countries are rated on their mili-
tary potential by aggregating scores for their Army, Navy,
and Air Force. Using a multiplicative index produces the
following results.
FIGURE 4
RESULTS OF A MULTIPLICATIVE INDEX
COUNTRY ARMY (:X) NAVY (;x) AIR FORCE (
MILITARY
=) POTENTIAL
A 5 2 3 30




Using the same values with an additive index seems to
produce a more realistic measure.
FIGURE 5
RESULTS OF AN ADDITIVE INDEX
COUNTRY
MILITARY
ARMY (+) NAVY (+) AIR FORCE (=) POTENTIAL
A 5 2 3 10
B 5 1 3 9
C 5 5 10
Another, less significant, problem developed
because two different scales were employed in the "event
assessment." Probability values were quantified between
zero and one, while significance scores ranged from one
to five. This further distorted the multiplicative index.
As a result the impact scores produced an analysis event
set which did not seem to accurately reflect the event's
relative importance. To overcome this problem two correc-
tions were introduced to the aggregation procedure.
The significance ratings were rescaled to
fall between zero and one. The final ratings employed
were: 5=.95, 4=.7, 3=.5, 2= . 3 , and 1=.05. Then the
individual probability and significance ratings were
summed to produce an individual event impact rating.
All three ratings were then averaged to produce a group or
mean score, and the standard deviations were computed for

each measure. These are the values presented in Appendix
A.
This correction is not without conceptual
limitations. The assumption implicit in summing the two
evaluation measures is that both probability and signifi-
cance are equally important in determining an event's
impact on the problem environment. It is doubtful whether
this assumption would hold up under rigorous examination.
It appears that an event's significance would be a more
important consideration than its occurrence probability.
This is because an event's impact has no meaning should it
not occur, therefore, it only becomes important from a
policy standpoint once it occurs, and this importance
derives from its significance to the situation. This prob-
lem relates to Gordon's discussion of the complex factors
which make up an event's cross-impact [Ref. 24] . Presently
there exists no algorithm relating the many factors (such
as probabilities of "feasibility" and "pursuit", and event
significance) which compose an event's impact. As a result
simple summing was the only approach which could be readily
applied.
Candidate events were ranked by impact scores
and six events selected to form the analysis set. A final
ranking by event impact scores is contained in Appendix A.
Because one purpose of the demonstration was to examine the
cross-impact technique's applicability to evaluating specific
policy response options these six events were not chosen from
1 ?q

the top ranked candidate events. The six top ranked events
included only one event identified as a response option
(number three)
.
This was because, while most response
events were evaluated as having high initial probabilities,
their significance was evaluated as being relatively low.
To obtain a matrix containing an equal number of response
events and situation development events, the events were
separated and the top three chosen from each category.
The analysis event set and the mean initial
probabilities are presented below. Six events were used
because this was felt to be the maximum number which could
be effectively manipulated by hand. It should be noted that
the initial probability values have been rounded to two
decimal places. The averaging technique used retained three
decimal place values for comparison purposes. Because
these values were averaged subjective estimates, this
degree of accuracy would not be jsutified for use in the
actual demonstration. This event set formed the basis for
the remaining individual estimates, that is, the five
causal time-dependent relationships developed by Mitchell
and Tydeman.
This result is interesting due to its implications.
Although the U.S. is assumed to have an extensive number
of responses available which could be employed in a given
situation, the respondents obviously felt that the majority
of these would be ineffective in this case. Of the three
response options included in the analysis, only one had a





No. STATEMENT Avg. P.




28 Soviet Union builds up Indian Ocean
squadron. .80
23 Soviet Union airlifts supplies to
Afghanistan. .72
3 United States deploys CTF to
Indian Ocean. .76
9 United States evacuates civilians
from area. .84
8 United States offers to negotiate
a cease-fire. .64
b. Estimate Relationships
The six-event set produced fifteen possible
event pairs which required further estimation. The
required estimates were the five time-dependent probabili-
ties (C, through Cj.) which assessed occurrence, non-
occurrence, and joint occurrence. Thus, seventy-five
estimates were required from each respondent.
In order to systematically produce and collect
these estimates, response forms were duplicated from the
examples provided by Mitchell and Tydeman [Ref. 29, p. 146-




FORM FOR EXTIMATING C AND C
Would the prior occurrence of event # cause your estimate
of the Probability of event # to:
Increase Stay the same Decrease
If your estimate of event # probability is changed (increased
or decreased) is the magnitude of the change:




5 10 25 50 100
(% of total possible change)
FIGURE 7
FORM FOR ESTIMATING C^ AND C,
2 4
Would the prior non-occurrence of event # cause your
estimate of the Probability of event # to:
Increase Stay the Same Decrease
If your estimate of event # probability is changed Cincreased
or decreased) is the magnitude of the change:
Only Slight A Little A Fair Bit A Lot Sufficient to make
event # certain
or impossible
5 10 25 50 100




FORM FOR ESTIMATING C,
Assuming both events # and # occur within the next 14 days
Event is certain to occur first
Event is very likely to occur first
Event is likely to occur first
Event and event are equally likely to occur first
Event is likely to occur first
Event is very likely to occur first
Event is certain to occur first
These forms were organized by selecting the
first event in the set and pairing it with the remaining
five events. The next series of estimates paired the second
event with the remaining four events and so on until all
fifteen event pairs had been specified. Because there were
seventy-five total estimates, the forms were delivered to
the respondents in two batches. Each respondent was given
two days to complete each batch. The forms were then
collected and sorted by event pair and the relationships
assessed. The ten responses for each relationship were
averaged to produce a mean score for each relationship.
These scores are contained in Appendix A.
Several complaints were voiced by the respon-
dents concerning this estimation procedure. This approach
made the estimation process monotonous. Three questions
were repeated with only different event numbers
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being inserted to complete the seventy-five data points.
In addition, the question wording was felt to be tortuous,
specifically through use of the terms "prior occurrence",
and "prior non-occurrence".
These problems result from manually replicating
the cross-event procedure. It was not possible in the
time available to devise an optimal question format for
each event pair. Such a format could have incorporated
the event statements within the question. For example
the following formulation for event pair (28,3) would
probably have been more acceptable:
"Assuming the Soviet Union builds up its
Indian Ocean fleet, would you estimate
the probability that the U.S. deploys
a CTF to the Indian Ocean to:"
and for non-occurrence:
"Assuming the Soviet Union does not
build up its Indian Ocean fleet, would
you estimate the probability ..."
Such a format could obviously be constructed for each
event pair. Several advantages might stem from adopting
this approach. The more precise wording explicitly
incorporates the event statements being considered. The
causal time-dependent nature of the relationship being
explored is implicit in the question without employing
phrases such as "prior occurrence." As a result the response;
obtained might be more accurate and consistent, however,
this fact cannot be validated without further analysis of
how respondents interpret questions.
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Another problem encountered in the procedure
was not voiced by the respondents, but was hypothesized
to account for the responses obtained when the group values
were analyzed. The analysis of the responses presented in
the next section found that every event pair was inconsistent
in terms of the P^ through Pg ordered outcome probabilities
computed. This problem was felt to result, at least par-
tially, from the sequence in which estimates had been
obtained.
The sequence used in this demonstration was
selected because it systematically specified all the event
pairs. This was necessary to insure that all respondents
received the proper forms and thus provided all required
estimates. However, this may have been an inappropriate
way to precede through the event pair set for estimation
purposes. In addition, the five relationships being esti-
mated were not presented to the respondents in order. The
joint occurrence question [Cn) being retained until the
end of each series (Event 1 | Event 2,..., event 6) of the C^
through C. questions.
As the respondents answered the questions in
the order of presentation, it is possible that they lost
track of the values previously specified. It is also
possible that the respondents were prevented from con-
sidering their previous responses concerning event pairs
which might have been felt to be related to each other.
Once again these possibilities cannot be verified without
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experimental analysis. No doubt, there is an optimal way
to present the event set for estimation.
This conclusion is based on two arguments pre-
sented in the cross-impact theory discussion. First, Enzer
suggested that probabilities of conditional relationships
were bounded by the probabilities previously specified for
that event pair. If this is true then this condition could
also apply to the time-dependent causal probabilities. The
second argument is even more basic to cross-impact theory.
Gordon suggested that most events are related
in some way. Enzer approached this conclusion in his dis-
cussion of coupling. It therefore seems reasonable that the
discrete events composing a set may all be coupled in some
way. This, it should be noted, is not the concept of higher
order interactions which Turoff attempted to measure, but
refers to direct relationships among all events in the set.
Assuming such a situation is present, then in order to pro-
duce a consistent set of estimates, a respondent needs to
be able to review and incorporate not only his previous
estimates within an event pair but among event pairs as well.
In summary, the problems encountered and sus-
pected in this process were: CD monotony, C2) imprecise
question wording, and (3) inappropriate question sequence.
To overcome these problems it would be necessary to devise
an estimation procedure which: (1) formulates questions using
the event statements, (2) develops a more exact question
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structure, (3) allows estimators to review their responses
as they estimate, and (4) allows estimators to compare
their responses across related event pairs.
One possible approach to overcoming these prob-
lems might be to use an interactive computer program to
elicit estimator responses. This approach was demonstrated
by Turoff
.
As proposed here, the program would allow the
respondent to make estimates on the basis of responses con-
cerning other estimates. Obvious extensions to this approach
include computing probability boundaries as suggested by
Dalkey, and displaying results to allow re-estimation as
suggested by Turoff. Using an interactive computer would
aid in obtaining consistent probability estimates (this
problem will be returned to in a later section) . It might
also provide useful data for determining how respondents
interpret questions posed, and for devising an optimal
estimation sequence.
Despite the problems encountered by the respon-
dents, and because the suspected problems were not immediately
apparent, the respondents" estimates were collected and
averaged as planned. These values formed the input for
computing the eight ordered outcome probabilities for each
event pair.
3 . Analysis
The next phase in the demonstration was to replicate
the analyses performed by Mitchell and Tydeman as extended
for this application. This required that the responses
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obtained be converted into conditional probabilities, and
that these be used to construct a cross-event matrix and
generate scenarios. This section will describe the compu-
tational procedure used and discuss the results obtained.
a. Computational Procedure
Once the respondents' estimates were averaged
and the standard deviations for each relationship computed,
mean values were used to compute the ordered outcome proba-
bilities. The P^ through Pg values for each event pair
were calculated using the formula derived by Mitchell and
Tydeman as presented in Section E of Chapter Three. These
values were used to compute the conditional probabilities,
however, unlike the Mitchell and Tydeman demonstration,
every event pair was found to have inconsistent results
.
According to Mitchell and Tydemand inconsistency
exists when any outcome probability is negative [Ref. 29,
p. 142]. In fact pairwise inconsistency from a probabilistic
standpoint is manifested by a value >1 or <0, and is indi-
cated when the common factors a, 3/ and y exceed unity or
become negative. The calculated outcome probabilities for
each event pair are presented in Appendix B.
The cross-event procedure uses a minimum stan-
dard deviation fitting technique to resolve pairwise incon-
sistency. This technique, as described in Chapter Three,
was felt to be inappropriate for use in this demonstration.
One reason was that it would require an excessive amount of
time to resolve fifteen inconsistent sets. Also, the
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technique, as demonstrated by the developers in a case
resolving individual inconsistency, zeroed the inconsistent
values. Of the fifteen event pairs developed in this study,
over half the outcomes in twelve pairs were inconsistent
while six pairs had seven or more inconsistent values. As
a result, it was felt that the fitting technique would
destroy too much potentially useful information.
Even though the ordered outcome probabilities
were apparently inconsistent, it was still possible to com-
pute conditional probabilities using the formulae devised
by Mitchell and Tydeman. These conditional probabilities
would doubtlessly also be inconsistent from a probabilistic
standpoint, however, in the cases where one conditional
probability appeared consistent it would be possible to
employ Enzer's boundary rule to resolve the second proba-
bility. As in the case of the fitting technique, this pro-
cedure was expected to destroy at least half of the potential
information. In addition, the boundary rule could not be
applied in cases where both conditional probabilities appeared
to be inconsistent.
Because the demonstration results were apparently
inconsistent, it was not possible to produce all the data
required for the intended analysis and evaluation. Having
only the ordered outcome probabilities precluded any attempt
to determine event dominance and sensitivity. Nor was the
required data produced for completing the cross-event matrix
and undertaking scenario generation. Therefore, it was not
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possible to conduct the analyses which use these tools. In
particular, the demonstration could not be used to determine
the validity of the proposed extension which included dis-
crete policy options in the event matrix. Even so, it is
still felt that this was a practicable extension, given a
workable cross-impact format, which could become a useful
analytical tool.
Two alternatives for solving the inconcsistency
problem seemed to present themselves. The designed study
could be continued by arbitrarily specifying a consistent
set of values. This alternative would have ignored the
study's intended purpose of assessing the utility and
effectiveness of cross-impact analysis as a possible
decision-aid by forcing the methodology to work rather than
examining its problems and their implications.
The second alternative was to examine the appar-
ent inconsistencies to determine if they were in fact incon-
sistent. It would then be possible to determine; a) why
the information was inconsistent and what corrective measures
could be taken, or b) why the information appeared to be
inconsistent, and how it could be used if it was in fact
consistent. This alternative was selected. The approach
used will be described in the following section,
b. Exploring the Inconsistency Dilemma
The first task in exploring the inconsistency
problem was to determine if the demonstration results were
in fact inconsistent. To do this the cross-event approach's
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assumptions and implications were re-examined. It was
obvious that the collected data provided enough information
to rank the ordered outcome probabilities. If the outcome






- 8! possible rank combinations. If it
could be shown that the fifteen combinations obtained during
the demonstration formed a pattern displaying some underlying
logical consistency apart from the consistency demanded by
the constraints of probability theory, and if this pattern
occurred in a statistically significant number of cases,
then the responses could be demonstrated to provide useful
information which might otheirwise be masked by routine
cross-impact analysis techniques.
The respondents had been asked for causal,
time-dependent estimates which were used to compute ordered
outcome probabilities. The estimates were obtained by
assuming the certain occurrence or non-occurrence of an
event (cause) and assessing the change in probability this
produced in another event's probability (effect). The out-
come probabilities computed using these estimates were time
sequences, which retained this cause and effect structure.
The eight ordered outcomes could, therefore, be paired by
33
opposite cause. This resulted in pairing the following
Actually, several pairing methods were possible. For
example: Transpose (i,j with j/i)^ opposite cause (i,j with
i,j), opposite effect (i,j with i,j), and opposite cause and
effect (i,j with i,j). However, since the relationship being
estimated assumed known cause (prior occurrence or non-
occurrence) , in effect holding cause constant, the opposite
cause pairing was considered more relevant for testing.
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outcomes: Pj_ - p^ (i,j with I, j ) , p^ - P^ (i,J with I, J) ,
P5 - Py (j,i with J,i), and Pg - Pg (j, I with J,!). if
the respondents had been consistent, it could be argued
that the pairing of probability ranks by cause would reveal
some logical pattern. To accept this argument, the pattern
would have to appear more frequently than could be expected
by random chance.
Upon pairing the probability rankings in the
fifteen cases (one for each event pair) by cause, several
patterns were noted. These are depicted in Appendix B.
As stated above 8! combinations are possible. To show con-
sistency a pattern would have to permit prediction (i.e.,
by knowning one outcome probability's rank it would be
possible to determine its pair's rank.) By this criterion
one obviously consistent pattern was noted and termed
the "Chinese Box".
The "Chinese Box" pattern paired the first and
last, second and seventh, third and sixth and, fourth and
fifth ranked probabilities. The pattern was intuitively
pleasing as it indicated that the respondents had ranked
last the opposite cause to the cause ranked first, ranked
next to last the opposite cause to the cause ranked second,
and so forth. This pattern implied that some logical con-
sistency existed in the way respondents linked cause and
effects in the demonstration situation. A second consistent
pattern could also be identified although it was intuitively
less rigorous. This was actually a family of patterns which
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existed when one pair and its opposite pair were located
in the upper half and lower half of the scale respectively.
This also implies some degree of consistency although it
does not allow exact prediction. The "Chinese Box" pattern
was selected for testing because it was more rigorous, and
could be expected to occur less frequently by random chance
than the simple upper-lower split.
A "Chinese Box" occurs when one of the outcome
pairs is ranked in position one through four before its
pair is ranked in the corresponding position from the bottom
up (eight to five). Thus there are P^ =
-^ = 41 combinations
which produce this pattern. But since P, can be replaced
by P3, ^2 ^^^ ^^ replaced by P^, P can be replaced by P^,
and Pg can be replaced by Pg, the actual number of combina-
tions is given by 41 x2x2x2x2= 384. Thus the
theoretical probability of observing a "Chinese Box" can
be determined as 384/81 = .0095 = .01. During the demon-
stration the following results were obtained. In the fif-
teen cases, eight obviously inconsistent sets occurred and
seven apparently consistent sets were observed. This pro-
duces an experimental frequency of .47. Two tests were
used to determine if this result was statistically signifi-
cant.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one sample test provided
the following results for a sample set of N = 15 cases,







the theoretical c-umulative distribution
of cases
the observed cumulative frequency dis-
tribution of a random sample of 15 cases
the maximum deviation between F (X) and
S^5(X) or |F^(X) - S^3(X) | °
The critical value for D at the .01 significance level is
.404 for 15 cases [Siegel, 1956, Table E, p. 251].
TABLE FIVE
CONSISTENCY PATTERNS IN 15 CASES








D = iF^(X) - S^3(X) 6.85/15 = .456
Since D = .456 > .404, this finding is evaluated as signifi-
cant at the .01 level. However, as in most cases involving
a small N this conclusion would not be justified if the
number of consistent outcomes was reduced by one. For six
consistent outcomes D = .39 and is only significant at the
.05 level where the critical D is .338.
As an additional check on the statistical signi-
ficance of this outcome and in order to determine the probability
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that this demonstration represents a random sample, the
Binomial Test was applied [Siegel, 1956, p. 36-42]. In
this test:
P = proportion of cases expected to be consistent
Q = 1 - P = proportion of cases expected to be
inconsistent
N = number of cases
X = number of observed consistent outcomes
The probability of observing exactly seven consistent out-
comes is given by:





Thus p(7) = 0, and the probability of observing five or more
consistent outcomes can be computed similarly as p (x ^ 5)
=
.0000004. Since these tests both indicate that the observed
frequency of consistent rankings (.47) was significant,
the following conclusion was reached.
Although all event pairs were evaluated as being
inconsistent using the cross-event approach's probabilistic
criteria (any P^ through Pg < or > 1), in actuality seven
cases were consistent when the probabilities were ranked
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and paired by opposite cause. The implications of this
finding will be addressed in the concluding chapter.
D. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter described the implementation process de-
signed to demonstrate cross-event analysis in a hypothetical
crisis situation. Several problems were encountered in
putting the design into effect. During the estimation
phase it was discovered that a "brainstorming" session
could get out of control and range far from the intended
situation, or intimidate some respondents. It also seemed
that the respondents had difficulty thinking in terms of
discrete events. Furthermore, the method suggested for con-
ducting "event assessment" was found to be inappropriate
because it used two different scales and a multiplicative
index.
Other problems were encountered in estimating the
interrelationships between event pairs. Some problems arose
due to limitations in the implementation design, specifically,
the problems of monotony and imprecise question wording.
Because inconsistent probabilities were obtained, addi-
tional problems were suspected to exist in the estimation
process. These problems involved the sequence in which the
estimates were asked for and the fact that respondents might
have lost track of their previous responses in the course
of completing the forms. Finally, the way in which rela-
tionships were quantified was suspect.
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To overcome these problems, several solutions were
proposed. An experienced facilitator was recommended to
control the brainstorming process. In addition, incorporating
a method for respondent self-evaluation was suggested to
permit weighting estimates for reliability. Because respon-
dents apparently had difficulty conceptualizing discrete
events it was suggested that they thought in terms of inter-
relations or contingencies.
Improvements to the "event assessment" process included,
using similar scales for the measures being combined, and
adopting an additive impact index rather than a multiplici-
tive one. It was also noted that further research into the
components which constitute an event's impact, and their
relative importance was also desirable in order to devise
an appropriate algorithm for combining the various measures.
Overcoming the problems of monotony and imprecise question
wording in assessing interactions requires devising an
improved question format.
This improvement could be realized utilizing an inter-
active computer program. This would also allow respondents
to review their estimates, and could be extended to provide
probability bounds for estimates, and to present respondents
with a display of the results obtained from their inputs.
Such programs have been demonstrated in several applications
reviewed in this study. The other problems suspected in the
estimation process were only hypothesized and could not be
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verified without additional study. Data regarding question
sequence and respondents' thought processes could be col-
lected while using the interactive computer program.
Once the implementation problems were discussed and
possible solutions suggested, the experiment results were
presented and analyzed. It was found that the ordered out-
come probabilities for each event pair, as computed from
the respondents' estimates using the rules of probability
theory, contained inconsistent values. However, when the
information required from the respondents was presented as
causal, time-dependent estimates, and the information con-
tained by the computed output was presented as the respon-
dents' view of the sequence in which the two paired
events were likely to occur, another interpretation was
possible
.
The ordered outcome values could be ranked and paired
according to opposite cause. In seven of the fifteen
cases, this procedure produced a pattern suitable for exact
prediction. This "Chinese Box" pattern was shown to be
intuitively pleasing as an indication that the respondents
had been logically consistent in their responses.
In order to determine if this result was statistically
significant, two tests were applied to the data. The
Binomial Test showed that the probability of obtaining more
than five "Chinexe Boxes" was close to zero, while the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test showed that the results
obtained were significant at the .01 level. Therefore, it
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was decided that the respondents had been consistent in
almost half of the event pairs, and that the apparent
inconsistency in those cases resulted only because the
values computed did not produce valid probabilities.
The next chapter will explore the implications of this
finding for the future use of cross-impact analysis. This
will require evaluating the approach's basic assumptions
regarding how interactions are quantified and manipulated.
This evaluation will draw on the impression formed during
the brainstorming process that respondents may think in
terms of interrelations or contingencies. The future utility
of cross-impact analysis as a crisic decision-aid will be
assessed using the experience gained in applying the tech-
nique in this demonstration, and through drawing on the
feedback comments made by the study participants. Finally,
it is hoped to suggest possible improvements to the technique,





Aside from the several minor problems encountered in
implementing the selected cross-impact analysis technique
in a hypothetical situation, this study revealed a major
conceptual limitation in the technique. This conceptual
problem underlies a basic assumption which must be adopted
in any cross-impact approach. The problem stems from
deterroining what interpretation should be applied to the
estimates provided by the expert respondents. This problem
relates to determining how individual thought processes
actually work, and how complex relationships are concep-
tualized. The problem underlies any methodology which
attempts to employ subjective estimates.
In reviewing cross-impact analysis' basic concepts
and assumptions it was noted that several interpretations
could be applied to subjective estimates, depending on the
assumption made concerning the way individual's interpret
and analyze unfolding situations. These alternative inter-
pretations can be grouped into at least two main categories,
The first, which was pursued in this study, viewed the
estimates as causal probabilities. Under this interpreta-




The second interpretation views subjective estimates
as quantified variation estimates, or, as directly describing
how a change in one variable produces a change in another
variable. Under this interpretation, an individual is
assumed to be a more complex information processor than is
described by the Bayesian model. This interpretation was
used in the Turoff approach, which represented the results
obtained from the respondents' estimates as analogous to
correlation coefficients.
How the question of interpreting subjective estimates
is resolved forms the basis for the methodological approach
used in cross-impact analysis. The assumed interpretation
determines how inconsistency is identified and corrected.
It also influences the method used to obtain estimates and
produce cross-impact factors. For these reasons, determining
the appropriate assumption to be used in interpreting
estimates is essential to performing reliable, useful
cross-impact analysis.
The results obtained in this study indicate that a
probabilistic interpretation of estimates may not be appro-
priate. It was demonstrated that, although the ordered
outcome values were inconsistent as probabilities, a
significant number of event pairs contained an outcome
pattern which indicated that a consistent thought process
had occurred. Additionally, during event generation,




This chapter will address the question of how respondents
answer the cross-impact questions posed in light of the
study results. This discussion will focus on the alter-
native interpretations proposed, and how each of them may
be used in future cross-impact analysis applications. The
final section of this chapter will discuss the technique's
use as a decision-aiding methodology as it is currently
structured. This discussion will highlight the technique's
strengths and weaknesses in problem analysis.
B. INTERPRETING RESPONDENT ESTIMATES
Of the two interpretations proposed, the most frequently
employed is probability. The inherent advantages of this
interpretation were discussed in the technique selection
section of Chapter Three. These advantages were primarily
methodological in nature. The probabilistic assumption
provided a method for determining if respondents' estimates
were consistent. Furthermore, by using probabilistic rela-
tionships, a well structured algorithm for manipulating
estimates was also developed.
1. Probabilities
Using probability values restricted the estimated
and computed values to a range between one and zero.
Several procedures were designed to correct values which
exceeded these bounds. All of these procedures essentially
zeroed or made unity the extreme values. As demonstrated
in this study, use of these correction procedures could

destroy much information. This is true especially when a
large number of extreme responses are obtained. This study
also demonstrated that bounding the estimated values to
normal probability limits can disguise otherwise consistent
results. A possible explanation behind the excessive
number of extreme responses is that the respondents do not
easily conceptualize events and their interactions in
probabilistic terms.
This problem could be reduced if respondents were
trained to make probability estimates. An interactive
computer package could aid in this process. As discussed
previously, such a package could be structured to provide
respondents with the probability bounds for their future
estimates based on the values previously specified. The
program would also furnish the respondents with results
computed from their estimates. Repeated exposure to such
outputs could increase the respondents ' experience with
probabilistic relationships. Eventually, they might become
proficient in making consistent probabilistic estimates.
However, aside from the previously mentioned
methodological advantages, there does not appear to be any
innate justification for pursuing this solution. The results
of this study indicate that consistent responses can be
obtained when using other than consistent probability values.
If respondents do find probabilities difficult to work with,
yet can produce consistent responses through some other
thought process, it might be more appropriate to devise an

analytic procedure which taps expert opinions by using
some other algorithm. in this case, the second inter-
pretation given respondents ' estimates might be worthy of
increased attention and analysis.
2. Variations
The second interpretation given respondents'
estimates suggests that individuals may be more comfortable
working with a procedure which quantifies the variations
produced by one variable interacting with another variable.
The fact that the respondents appeared to think in terms
of contingencies during event generation lends some support
to this interpretation. If it can be determined that
respondents are more comfortable when dealing with relative
changes in events, a variation algorithm might be used to
collect and manipulate their estimates.
Two measures have been developed which describe the
relationships between variables (in this case events).
Either, or both might be developed for use in cross-impact
analysis. Turoff demonstrated the application of one
variation measure, a correlation-based algorithm, in his
cross-impact approach. The second variation measure,
regression, might also be appropriate for use in cross-
impact analysis.
Correlation coefficients range between minus and
plus one. These boundaries could produce constraints similar
to those encountered in using probabilities. However, using
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a correlation algorithm would retain a certain ease of
manipulation. In addition, it would also be possible to
obtain an indication of estimator consistency.
This capability derives from the fact that under
this interpretation the cross-impact matrix would be
analogous to a correlation matrix. Consistency could
therefore be determined through analyzing the matrix entries








In a correlation matrix, if variable C increases
with an increase in variable A; then variable A must increase
with an increase in variable C. In other words, the matrix
entries above the diagonal must mirror the entries below
the diagonal to be consistent.
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As a final consideration, the theory describing
correlation coefficients is well enough developed that
other analysis forms might be attempted. For example, the
technique of path analysis could be developed as a method
for tracing causal relationships. It might also be
possible to trace logical structures on adjacency matrices
using the principles developed by Harary [Ref. 4 2], and
demonstrated by Bonham, et al., and Axelrod [Refs. 44, 45,
and 43]
.
The correlation algorithm for cross-impacts might
also be extended into a regression algorithm.
Regression coefficients represent the second varia-
tion measure which might be applied to cross-impact analysis
Because regression coefficients can range between plus and
minus infinity, there would be no constraints imposed by
bounding estimate values. However, using a regression
algorithm could easily produce extremely large values,
limiting the ease with which estimates could be manipulated.
This fact is apparent upon recalling that some ordered out-
come values computed in this study exceeded a value of
thirty, and these were calculated using bounded estimates.
3 . Summary
This study's results indicate that the method used
in cross-event analysis to tap expert's opinions may be
inappropriate. Two alternatives might be used to overcome
this problem. The first possibility is to train respondents
to think in probabilistic terms. The second is to develop
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another algorithm for interpreting and manipulating their
estimates, possibly through using correlation or regression
coefficients
.
Choosing between these two alternatives cannot be
attempted without further study. The primary focus for
this additional study would be to empirically determine how
people actually conceptualize relationships between events.
Without an understanding of this crucial point, selection
of a cross-impact algorithm can only be made arbitrarily.
As a result, arbitrary estimate interpretation would
preclude giving any confidence to specific results obtained
from the analysis. Despite this problem, it is felt that
the methodology has some potential as an alternative
approach to decision analysis in socio-political
applications
.
C. CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS AS A DECISION-AID
Several advantages can be identified for the cross-impact
technique when employed in assessing complex situations.
First, its systematic approach assures that all problem
elements identified as important are considered. The step
by step procedure used can be easily traced to identify
important elements in the problem situation, and to suggest
areas requiring further study or close monitoring.
Secondly, the technique can serve as a valuable heuristic
device. Its systematic approach forces respondents to care-
fully evaluate each estimate (opinion) in conjunction with
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their other estimates, and to consider the estimates'
implications in toto. This requires that the experts fully
and consistently formulate an underlying paridigm which can
aid an individual or organization in problem definition.
Thus, cross-impact analysis can be a useful modeling tool
and problem specification approach.
In addition, because the technique is time sensitive,
its results can be used to monitor problem development, or
at least the way in which the experts perceive that develop-
ment. Through monitoring the development of cross-impact
matrices it might also be possible to learn more about how
individual, group, and organizational thought processes
evolve in response to evolving situations, changing informa-
tion streams, and differing perceptions of problem compo-
nents . Thus , the technique ' s continued use might contribute
to an understanding of how individuals process information
(providing the data with which to resolve the question of
how respondent's estimates should be interpreted), and how
they perceive developing systems.
Even without having completed the designed implementa-
tion, because inconsistent ordered outcome probabilities
were obtained, it is still possible to make some observa-
tions regarding cross-impact analysis' utility as a decision-
aid. Obviously, there are several problems which must be
corrected before the technique can be applied in a "real-
world" analysis. Many problems encountered in the
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demonstration arose from a lack of experience in conducting
subjective estimation sessions. Such "operator" problems
included controlling the brainstorming session, and
conducting the "event analysis." These problems were
discussed, and solutions suggested in Chapter Four. None
of the implementation problems appear to inhibit using the
technique as much as the conceptual problem previously
discussed.
The theory that interactions among discrete events can
be quantified and systematically assessed seems to be an
appropriate method for approaching complex, ill-defined
problems. The technique's demonstrated computer adapta-
bility enhances this attractiveness. Using a computer
makes it possible to identify a large number of events for
analysis. In some cases, it might be possible to practically
specify the entire problem environment. Although this would
require a very large number of estimates, they could be
obtained and manipulated with the computer. However, until
the conceptual question discussed in the previous section






1. Candidate event set, probability and significance
ratings, impact scores (standard deviations)
No. Event
Statement Prob (S.D.) Sig. (S.D.) Irrp. (S.D.)_
1 Kurds in Soviet Union
revolt.
.115 .08 .48 .31 .62 .27
2 Egypt closes Suez
Canal to Soviets.










.53 .28 .71 .25 1.24 .47
5 Soviet Union block-
ades Gulf of Oman.
.275 .19 .725 .25 1.0 .32
6. Soviet Union mines
St, of Hormuz
.
.185 .14 .77 .25 .955 .26
7 United States appeals
to all parties to
cease hostilities.
.805 .13 .18 .17 1.04 .17
8 United States offers
to negotiate cease
fire.
.64 .18 .48 .23 1.12 .27
9 United States evac-
uates civilians
from area.
,835 .10 .305 .14 1.135 .14
10 China ships arms to
Baluchi rebels.
.575 .27 .575 .16 1.15 .39









Prob (S.D.) Sig. (S.D.) Imp. (S.D.)
12 Chinese mobilize in
Sinkiang.
.505 .25 .715 .20 1.22 .37
13 Iranian leftists
sabotage oil fields.
.485 .16 .715 .16 1.20 .27
14 United States states
it has no intention
of becoming involved
in the situation.
.275 .10 .675 .31 .945 .28
15 Leftists seize
control in Iran.




.885 .08 .195 .14 1.08 .17









.71 .18 .375 .13 1.09 .13
19 Civil War breaks
out in Iran.






.385 .25 .570 .22 .955 .42
21 Ayatolla Khomeini
calls for Jihad.
.48 .25 .545 .27 1.03 .27
22 Soviet backed Afghani
forces subjugate
Baluchistan.
.595 .15 .885 .14 1.48 .19
23 Soviet Union air-
lifts supplies to
Afghanistan.
.72 .20 .65 .17 1.37 .34
24 United States sends
aid to Pakistan.
.465 .16 .60 .12 1.07 .24
25 United States sends
aid to Iran.






































22* S.U. /Afghan forces gain control 3* U.S. deploys CiV
28* S.U. builds up I.O. sqdm. 9* U.S. evacuates civilians
3 U.S. deploys Cl'i" 8* U.S. offers negotiation
23* S.U. supplies Afghanistan 7 U.S. appeals for cease fire
4 S.U. mobilizes Chinese border 24 Aid Pakistan
19 Civil War in Iran 20 Convoy oil
12 Chinese mobilize in Sinkiang 25 Aid Iran
13 Leftists sabotage oil in Iran 14
•
Non-involvement
15 Leftist coTjp in Iran 27 F-15's to Saudi Arabia
10 China arms Raluchis 26 Troops to Saudi Arabia
(* indicates events chosen for analysis)





(i J) (J i) (i 3)
^4
(j i) (if i&j)
(22,28)
.6 .8
.66 .83 .56 .80 .23
(22,23)
.6 .72






(i J) (J i) (i :)
^4
(j i) (if i&j)
(22,3)
.6 .76
.57 .85 ,67 .76 .51
(22,9)
.6 .84
.68 .92 .59 .83 .51
(22,8)
.8 .72
.58 .61 .65 .68 .32
(28,23)
.8 .76
.82 .77 .79 .72 .56
(28,3)
.8 .84
.86 .87 .80 .75 .61
(28,9)
.8 .64
.81 .86 .80 .84 .77
(28,8)
.72 .76
.8 .66 .81 .66 .74
(23,3)
.72 .84
.75 .81 .73 .75 .56
(23,9)
.72 .64
.73 .86 .72 .83 .78
(23,8)
.76 .84
.73 .70 .73 .64 .69
(23,9)
.76 .84
.79 .86 .78 .83 .80
(3,8)
.76 .84
.77 .65 .77 .68 .52
(9,8)
.84i .64


















(22,28) 2.6 .53 -9.7 -2.4 8.7 4.5 39.3 30.9
(22,23) 5.1 .53 -15.3 -7.4 16.3 6.3 -66.6 -56.8
(22,3) 1.6 .28 -2.5 -.78 1.5 1.2 -2.7 -1.3
(22,9) -1.5 -.13 -.6 -.12 -1.5 -.69 3.6 2.5
(22,8) 4.5 2,9 -18.3 -8.6 6.1 4.5 -22.4 -12.1
(28,23) 1.3 .38 -1.3 -.51 1.0 .22 -1.3 -.35
(28,3) 1.2 .12 -1.2 -.39 .75 .12 -.55 -.14
(28,9) 1.5 .24 -.55 -.10 .44 .10 .16 .04
(28,8) -.16 -.1 -.70 -.36 -.06 -.02 .91 .21
(23,3) 1.4 .32 -1.4 -.47 1.1 .37 -1.5 -.55
(23,9) 1.2 .19 -.57 -.12 .34 .13 .23 .09
(23,8) 2.3 .97 -1.2 -.67 1.0 .38 -1.2 -.44
(3,9) 1.1 .18 -.48 -.10 .28 .07 .37 .08
(3,8) 1.9 1.0 1.8 -.85 1.7 .50 -3.4 -1.0
(9,8) 1.2 .63 -2.7 -1.3 2.3 .50 -6.8 -1.2
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2. Probability rankings by Event Pair
(22,28) Or: Sov/Afg. forces gain control of Baluchistan,



















Pairing by 0pp. Cause
(22,23) Or: Sov/Afg. forces gain control of Baluchistan,
Soviets airlift supplies to Afghanistan




















(22,3) Or: Sov/Afg. forces gain control of Baluchistan,
U.S. deploys CTF to I.O.
























p nconsistent, however, value difference
from rank 7 to rank 8 is only .2; therefore,
possibly consistent
(22,9) Or: Sov/Afg. forces gain control of Baluchistan,
U.S. evacuates civilians from area




















(22,8.) Or: Sov/Afg. forces gain control of Baluchistan,


















Pairing by 0pp. Cause
u
Evaluation: Consistent
(28,23) Or: S.U. builds up I.O. squadron,
Soviets airlift supplies to Afghanistan
















(I,j) Sc (j,i) TIE
Evaluation: Consistent because P^ ~ ^7
177

(28,3) Or: S.U. builds up I.O. squadron
U.S. deploys CTF to I.O.



















Evaluation: Consistent due to tie as in previous case.
(28,9) Or: S.U. builds up I.O. squadron,
U.S. evaculates civilians from area



















(28,8) Or: S.U. builds up I.O. squadron


















Pairing by 0pp. Cause
H
Evaluation: Inconsistent
(23,3) Or: S.U. airlifts supplies to Afghanistan,
U.S. deploys CTF to I.O.

























(23,9) Or: S.U. airlifts supplies to Afghanistan,




















Pairing by 0pp. Cause
n
(23,8) Or: S.U. airlifts supplies to Afghanistan,
U.S. offers to negotiate a cease-fire
















Dif . i = .01
Apparently Inconsistent, however, value




(3,9) Or: U.S. deploys CTF to I.O.
U.S. evacuates civilians from area




















(3,8) Or: U.S. deploys CTF to I.O.,
U.S. offers to negotiate a cease-fire


















9,8 Or: U.S. evacuates civilians from area,















Pairing by 0pp. Cause
H
Evaluation: Consistent
3. Summary of Results
Case Pair Consistent Order
1 (22,28) NO 7 , 8 r 5,, 6 , 1 - 2, 4 , 3
2 (22,23) YES 5.r 6, 1 , 2 r 4; 3, 8 , 7
3 (22,3) NO 1 r 5, 6.- 2 - 4, 8. 3., 7
4 (22,9) NO 7 , s, 4,, 2 - 3< 6, 5,, 1
5 (22,8) YES 5 r I., 6 - 2, 4, 8, 3. 7
6 (28,23) YES 1 r 5, 2,- 6. 8;- 4, 7/ 3
7 (28,3) YES 1 - 5, 2 6 r 8, 4; 7. 3
8 (28,9) NO 1 5;- 2, 7 r 6, 8, 4, 3
9 (28,8) NO - 7 - 8,, 6 - 5 - 2,- 1 4, 3
10 (23,3) YES 1,- 5, 6 , 2 - 4, 8, 7< 3
11 (23,9) NO 1 r 5, 7 , 2 - 6,- 8, 4, 3
12 (23,8) YES 1 , 5, 2 , 6 r 8 r 4, 7. 3
13 (3,9) NO 1-- 7 - 5,, 2 , 8 , 6 , 4, 3
14 (3,8) NO 1 , 3 , 5 , 2 r 6,r 4 , 8 , 7
15 (9,8) YES 5 r 1 , 2 , 6 , 8 , 4 r 3 , 7
All inconsistent outcome orders are unique.
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